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Taxation Without Representation:  
The Illegal IRS Rule to Expand 
Tax Credits under the PPACA* 
Jonathan H. Adler† & Michael F. Cannon†† 
Abstract 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) provides 
tax credits and subsidies for the purchase of qualifying health insurance 
plans on state-run insurance exchanges. Contrary to expectations, many 
states are refusing or otherwise failing to create such exchanges. An 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rule purports to extend these tax credits 
and subsidies to the purchase of health insurance in federal exchanges 
created in states without exchanges of their own. This rule lacks 
statutory authority. The text, structure, and history of the Act show 
that tax credits and subsidies are not available in federally run 
exchanges. The IRS rule is contrary to congressional intent and cannot 
be justified on other legal grounds. Because tax credit eligibility can 
trigger penalties on employers and individuals, affected parties are likely 
to have standing to challenge the IRS rule in court.  
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Introduction 
On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA or “the Act”) into law.1 
The PPACA creates a complex scheme of new government regulations, 
mandates, subsidies, and agencies in an effort to achieve  
near-universal health insurance coverage. Immediately after passage, a  
majority of state attorneys general and numerous business and public 
interest groups filed suit challenging various portions of the new law—
most notably the so-called “individual mandate” and Medicaid 
expansion. This litigation wound its way to the US Supreme Court, 
which produced a divided ruling upholding the constitutionality of the 
mandate but limiting the Medicaid expansion.2 Yet this decision did not 
end the controversy surrounding the PPACA.3 Additional litigation has 
already ensued and is likely to continue in the years to come.4 
 
1. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation 
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
2. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) 
(upholding the constitutionality of the individual mandate as a tax but 
invalidating conditioning of federal Medicaid funds on state acceptance of 
Medicaid expansion). 
3. News reports suggesting Chief Justice John Roberts may have switched his 
vote after oral argument have only fueled the controversy. See Jan 
Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS News 
(July 1, 2012, 1:29 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-
57464549/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law/. 
4. See Rob Field, Legal Challenges to Obamacare Live On, The Field 
Clinic (Dec. 7, 2012, 12:31 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/ 
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The PPACA’s congressional sponsors created incentives for states to 
implement much of the law and reasonably expected that states would 
do so.5 States help implement many complex federal programs like 
Medicaid and the Clean Air Act. Among other things, the PPACA 
encourages states to create new agencies called health insurance 
“Exchanges” to execute many of the law’s key features. If a state fails to 
create an Exchange that meets federal standards, the Act authorizes the 
federal government to create a “fallback” Exchange for that state. As an 
inducement to state officials, the Act authorizes tax credits and subsidies 
for certain households that purchase health insurance through an 
Exchange, but restricts those entitlements to Exchanges created by 
states. Apparently this was not inducement enough. 
Contrary to initial expectations, a large number of states will not 
create Exchanges before the PPACA’s key provisions take effect in 2014. 
As Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Kathleen Sebelius 
commented in February 2012, the federal government could be 
 
blogs/fieldclinic/legal-challenges-to-obamacare-live-on.html; Jonathan H. 
Adler, The ObamaCare Cases Keep Coming, National Review Online 
(Oct. 15, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
articles/330400/obamacare-cases-keep-coming-jonathan-h-adler; Jack M. 
Balkin, The Right Strikes Back: A New Legal Challenge for Obamacare, 
The Atlantic Online (Sept. 17, 2012, 12:49 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/09/the-right-strikes-
back-a-new-legal-challenge-for-obamacare/262443/; Jennifer Haberkorn, 
More Legal Challenges to ACA on Way, Politico (July 3, 2012, 5:49 
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/78104.html; Michael 
Doyle, It Ain’t Over—More Legal Challenges to Health Care Law Coming, 
McClatchy Washington Bureau (June 29, 2012, 5:37 PM), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/06/29/v-print/154456/it-aint-over-
more-legal-challenges.html; Foes Plan Next Wave of Healthcare Lawsuits, 
MSNBC (June 18, 2012), http://leanforward.msnbc.msn.com/ 
_news/2012/06/18/12284836-foes-plan-next-wave-of-healthcare-lawsuits. 
5. See Departments of Labor, Health & Human Services, Education, & 
Related Agencies Appropriations for 2011: Hearing Before a Subcomm. on 
Appropriations, House of Representatives, 111th Cong. 171 (Apr. 21, 2010) 
(statement of Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.) 
[hereinafter Statement of K. Sebelius], available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg58233/pdf/CHRG-111hh 
rg58233.pdf (“We have already had lots of positive discussions, and States 
are very eager to do this. And I think it will very much be a State-based 
program.”); Kaiser Family Found., Health Care Reform 
Newsmaker Series: Sen. Max Baucus, Kaiser Family Foundation, 
Families USA and the National Federation of Independent 
Business 23 (2009) (“States will still be able to make a lot of decisions, 
perhaps, but there will be significant measures left to states, but still in a 
way where Americans will know, that in whatever state they live, that 
they’re going to get quality, they’re getting affordable, and access to 
affordable, quality healthcare.”). 
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responsible for running Exchanges in fifteen to thirty states.6 Yet dozens 
of states are either dragging their heels or flatly refusing to cooperate 
with implementation.7 As of February 15, 2013, only seventeen states 
and the District of Columbia have signaled intent to create a PPACA-
compliant Exchange, leaving the federal government responsible for 
creating them in thirty-four states.8  
This apparent miscalculation creates a number of problems for 
implementation of the PPACA. The tax credits and subsidies for the 
 
6. See J. Lester Feder, Sebelius: Exchange Funding Request Was Anticipated, 
Politico Pro (Feb. 14, 2012), https://www.politicopro.com/go/?id=9220 
(“We don’t know if we’re going to be running an exchange for 15 states, or 
30 states.”). 
7. See J. Lester Feder & Jason Millman, Exchanges Hit Roadblocks in Red 
States, Politico (Apr. 18, 2012, 11:33 PM), http://www.politico.com/ 
news/stories/0412/75331.html; see also Elise Viebeck, Fifteen Governors 
Reject or Leaning Against Expanded Medicaid Program, The Hill (July 
3, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-reform-
implementation/236033-fifteen-governors-reject-or-leaning-against 
-expanded-medicaid-program. 
8. Tom Howell Jr., After Obamacare Health Exchange Deadline Passes, 26 
States Opt in with Feds, Washington Times (Feb. 16, 2013), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/16/after-obamacare-
health-exchange-deadline-passes-26/?page=all; see also State Decisions for 
Creating Health Insurance Exchanges in 2014, Kaiser State Health 
Facts, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=962& 
cat=17 (last updated Feb. 15, 2013) (reporting that eighteen states, 
including Utah, have opted to create an exchange.). The thirty-three states 
that have opted not to establish an Exchange are: Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, 
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. This group also includes seven 
states—Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, North Carolina, and 
West Virginia—that have opted for a “partnership” Exchange, which HHS 
categorizes as a Section 1321 Exchange. See Establishment of Exchanges 
and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers; Final  
Rule and Interim Final Rule, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,310, 18,325 (Mar. 27,  
2012), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-03-27/pdf/2012-6125.pdf 
(“A Partnership Exchange would be a variation of a Federally-facilitated 
Exchange. Section 1321(c) of the Affordable Care Act establishes that if a 
State does not have an approved Exchange, then HHS must establish an 
Exchange in that State; the statute does not authorize divided authority or 
responsibility. This means that HHS would have ultimate responsibility for 
and authority over the Partnership Exchange.”). Yet Utah has informed 
HHS that it will not create an Exchange for the individual health insurance 
market. See Lisa Riley Roche, Gov. Herbert Now Wants Feds to Run 
Individual Health Insurance Exchange in Utah, Deseret News (Feb. 5, 
2013, 3:15 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865572340/Gov-
Herbert-calls-for-feds-to-run-individual-health-insurance-exchange-in-
Utah.html.  
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purchase of qualifying health insurance plans in state-run Exchanges serve 
as more than just an inducement to states. These entitlements also 
operate as the trigger for enforcement of the Act’s “employer mandate.” 
As a consequence, that mandate is effectively unenforceable in states that 
decline to create an Exchange. The tax credits further play a role in the 
enforcement of the Act’s “individual mandate,” such that a state’s 
decision not to create an Exchange would exempt a substantial portion of 
its residents from that mandate.9 Because such a large number of states 
have declined to create Exchanges of their own, it may be difficult to 
implement the law as supporters had hoped. 
A final Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rule issued on May 18, 2012, 
attempts to fix this problem by extending eligibility for tax credits and 
cost-sharing subsidies to those who purchase qualifying insurance plans 
in federally run Exchanges.10 The PPACA, however, precludes the IRS 
from issuing tax credits in federal Exchanges. The plain text of the Act 
only authorizes premium-assistance tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies 
for those who purchase plans on state-run Exchanges, and the IRS rule’s 
attempt to offer them to other individuals cannot be legally justified on 
other grounds. In other words, the IRS is attempting to create two 
entitlements not authorized by Congress and, in the process, to tax 
employers and individuals whom Congress did not authorize the agency 
to tax.  
It may be somewhat surprising that the PPACA contains such a 
gaping hole in its regulatory scheme. We were both surprised to discover 
this feature of the law and initially characterized it as a “glitch.”11 Yet 
our further research demonstrates that this feature was intentional and 
purposeful and that the IRS’s rule has no basis in law. This supposed fix 
is actually an effort to rewrite the law and to provide for something 
Congress never enacted—indeed, something that the PPACA’s authors 
chose not to include in the law.  
This Article explains the importance of the law’s limitation on the 
availability of tax credits for health insurance for implementation of the 
PPACA and details the case for and against the IRS rule. Part II 
 
9. We are indebted to Richard Urich for alerting us to the relationship 
between state-established Exchanges and the individual mandate’s 
affordability exemption. 
10. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,377 (May 
23, 2012). 
11. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Another ObamaCare 
Glitch, Wall St. J. (Nov. 16, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052970203687504577006322431330662.html. The authors were 
first made aware of this aspect of the PPACA by a presentation by 
attorney Thomas Christina at the American Enterprise Institute in 
December 2010. See Tom Christina, What to Look for Beyond the 
Individual Mandate (And How to Look for It), Am. Enter. Inst. (Dec. 6, 
2010), http://www.aei.org/files/2010/12/06/Christina20101206.pdf. 
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013 
Taxation Without Representation 
124 
provides a brief overview of the PPACA’s legislative history and 
explains the regulatory structure that the Act creates to govern private 
health insurance markets—paying particular attention to the instability 
the law introduces into those markets, the role of tax credits and 
subsidies in mitigating that instability, and the central role of health 
insurance “Exchanges.” Part III describes the IRS rule and the agency’s 
justification for it. Part IV shows how the IRS rule is contrary to the 
text, structure, purpose, and history of the PPACA. Part V identifies 
and evaluates other potential legal rationales for the IRS rule and finds 
them wanting. Part VI explains that while an IRS rulemaking expanding 
the eligibility of tax credits or subsidies beyond that authorized by 
Congress would normally escape judicial review, the interactions of the 
tax credit provisions with the law’s employer and individual mandates 
provides a basis for Article III standing to challenge the IRS rule. States 
may have standing to sue as well.12 In other words, this question is likely 
to be resolved in federal court. 
I. The PPACA 
What we now call the PPACA is the product of three different bills, 
two of which originated in the Senate and a third that made limited 
amendments to the final Senate bill at the behest of the House of 
Representatives. In 2009, two Senate committees reported major health 
care legislation. On September 17, the Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions (HELP) Committee approved the “Affordable Health Choices 
Act” (S. 1679).13 On October 19, the Senate Committee on Finance 
approved the “America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009” (S. 1796).14 The 
two Senate bills shared many features. Before either bill reached the 
Senate floor, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) assembled the 
chairmen of those committees and congressional and White House staff 
 
12. At the time of this writing, one state (Oklahoma) has filed suit against the 
IRS rule. See Wayne Greene, AG Pruitt Revises Health-care Suit, Aims to 
Block Affordable Care Act Taxes, Subsidies, Tulsa World (Sept. 20, 
2012, 8:22 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx? 
subjectid=711&articleid=20120920_16_A11_CUTLIN601704. 
13. Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress, S. 1697, Thomas, library of 
Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN01679:@@ 
@L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 25, 2013); Affordable Health Choices 
Act, S. 1679, 111th Cong. (2009). 
14. Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress, S. 1796, Thomas, Library of 
Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN01796: 
@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 25, 2013); America’s Healthy Future 
Act of 2009, S. 1796, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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in his office in the US Capitol, where they merged the two committee-
reported bills into the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.15  
Although Senate Democrats held a sixty-seat majority—the 
minimum necessary to break a Republican filibuster—Senator Reid had 
difficulty collecting yea votes from every member of his caucus.16 Once 
he had corralled all sixty votes, Senate Democrats broke the Republican 
filibuster. The new Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act cleared 
the US Senate before sunrise on December 24, 2009, without a vote to 
spare.17  
Congressional Democrats had intended to have a conference 
committee merge the PPACA with the “Affordable Health Care for 
America Act” (H.R. 3962) that had passed the House of Representatives 
in November.18 Had this occurred, the PPACA might look quite different 
than it does today. But in January 2010, Republican Scott Brown won a 
special election to fill the seat vacated by the death of Sen. Edward 
Kennedy (D-MA). Brown’s victory shifted the political terrain. It gave 
Senate Republicans the forty-first vote necessary to filibuster a 
conference report on the House and Senate bills.  
As a result, House and Senate Democrats abandoned a conference 
committee in favor of a novel strategy. House Democrats agreed to pass 
the PPACA exactly as it had passed in the Senate, but only upon 
receiving assurances that after the House amended the PPACA through 
the “budget reconciliation” process, the Senate would immediately 
approve those amendments. Because Senate rules protect reconciliation 
bills from a filibuster, the PPACA’s supporters needed only fifty-one 
votes to pass the House’s “reconciliation” amendments. The downside of 
this strategy was that the rules governing budget reconciliation limited 
the amendments House Democrats could make.19 Supporters opted for an 
 
15. David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, White House Team Joins Talks on 
Health Care Bill, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 2009, at A24 (quoting Senate 
Majority Leader Harry Reid: “This is legislating at its best.”). 
16. See Brian Montopoli, Tallying the Health Care Bill’s Giveaways, CBS 
News (Dec. 21, 2009, 3:56 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
503544_162-6006838-503544.html. 
17. See Vote Summary: On Passage of the Bill (H.R. 3590 as Amended), U.S. 
Senate, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_ 
vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00396 (last visited Jan. 25, 
2013). 
18. Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress, H.R. 3962, CRS Summary, 
Thomas, Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ 
bdquery/z?d111:HR03962:@@@D&summ2=1& (last visited Jan. 25, 2012); 
Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009). 
19. See John Carney, How Does Reconciliation Work in Congress?, Bus. 
Insider (Jan. 17, 2010) http://articles.businessinsider.com/2010-01-
17/news/29990286_1_41st-vote-filibuster-vote-republican-filibuster; Alan 
Greenblatt, Senate Faces Slog Over Health Bill Amendments, NPR (Mar. 
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imperfect bill—that is, a bill that did not accomplish all they may have 
set out to do, but for which they had the votes—over no bill at all. 
The Act signed into law by President Obama and the law that the 
IRS rule purports to implement—the PPACA—is thus a hybrid of the 
two Senate-committee-reported bills, as amended by the Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA).20 This history, and 
the need to resort to the reconciliation process to pass the final law, 
helps explain why the final legislation looks as it does and why the Act 
does not conform with the hopes or expectations of some of its 
supporters.21 
II. The PPACA’s Regulatory Structure 
The PPACA attempts to achieve near-universal health insurance 
coverage through an interdependent system of government price 
controls, mandates, and subsidies. To understand the significance of the 
IRS rule, it is important to understand the role of health insurance 
Exchanges and how they were intended to complement the other 
controls enacted by the PPACA. 
A. A Three-Legged Stool 
Among the central features of the PPACA are new regulatory controls 
limiting medical underwriting by health insurance companies.22 
Specifically, the Act requires carriers to charge individuals of a given age 
the same premium, regardless of their health status.23 This type of 
 
21, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 
124993274.  
20. Congress has further amended PPACA through subsequent legislation. 
Those amendments do not affect the matter at hand. 
21. For example, in January 2010, eleven House Democrats raised objections to 
relying upon the Senate’s state-based health insurance Exchanges as 
opposed to a single federal Exchange because of the potential for 
“obstruction.” See U.S. Rep. Doggett: Settling for Second-Rate Health Care 
Doesn’t Serve Texans, My Harlingen News (Jan. 11, 2010), 
http://www.myharlingennews.com/?p=6426. Despite these concerns, all 
eleven voted in favor of the PPACA. 
22. Mark A. Hall, The Factual Bases for Constitutional Challenges to the 
Constitutionality of Federal Health Insurance Reform, 38 N. Ky. L. Rev. 
457, 464 (2011) (noting that “prohibiting medical underwriting” is among 
the PPACA’s “core provisions.”). 
23. The Act prohibits carriers from adjusting premiums for any reason other 
than age (allowable variation: a 3 to 1 ratio for adults only); family size 
(two categories: individual or family); smoking status (carriers may charge 
smokers up to 50 percent more than nonsmokers); or by geographic “rating 
areas.” Carriers may not adjust premiums according to an applicant’s 
health status or sex. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat. 119, 155 (2010).  
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government price control, known as “community rating,” reduces 
premiums for those with pre-existing conditions but increases premiums 
for low-risk consumers and thereby encourages healthy people to wait 
until they fall ill to purchase health insurance.24 Such price controls can 
produce a vicious cycle of adverse selection: the influx of high-risk 
consumers and exodus of low-risk consumers cause premiums to rise, 
which leads additional low-risk customers to drop coverage, leading to 
further price increases, and so on.25 In other contexts, community-rating 
price controls have caused comprehensive health insurance plans and 
even entire carriers to exit certain health insurance markets,26 often to 
the point of market collapse.27 
To combat the instability introduced by its community-rating price 
controls, the Act imposes an “individual mandate” that requires nearly all 
Americans to purchase a health insurance policy offering a minimum 
package of “essential” coverage.28 Failure to comply may result in a 
 
24. The Act’s “guaranteed issue” provisions also require carriers to offer health 
insurance to all applicants, regardless of health status. 
25. Thomas C. Buchmueller, Consumer Demand for Health Insurance, NBER 
Reporter 10, 12 (2006) (discussing health insurance exchanges at 
Harvard University and the University of California system: “One factor 
contributing to adverse selection in the UC and Harvard cases is that, in 
each system, premium contributions faced by employees and premium 
payments to plans were ‘community rated’—that is, they did not vary with 
the risk characteristics of those being insured. As discussed earlier, one 
result is thus that the most generous plan faced an adverse selection death 
spiral.”). 
26. Id. at 11. 
27. Brief of Texas Public Policy Foundation & Cato Institute as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012) (Nos. 11-393 & 11-400) (“Before Congress took up health care 
reform in 2009, a handful of states had experimented with major health 
insurance reforms including guaranteed issue and some form of community 
rating compression, focused on the individual insurance market.”); S. 
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 112th Cong., Ranking 
Member Rep.: Health Care Reform Law’s Impact on Child-Only 
Health Insurance Policies 5 (Aug. 2, 2011); Richard S. Foster, 
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Estimated Financial 
Effects of the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” 
as Amended 15 (2010), available at https://www.cms.gov/Research-
Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/ActuarialStudies/downloads/ 
PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf (“Although Title VIII includes modest work 
requirements in lieu of underwriting and specifies that the program is to be 
‘actuarially sound’ and based on ‘an actuarial analysis of the 75-year costs 
of the program that ensures solvency throughout such 75-year period,’ 
there is a very serious risk that the problem of adverse selection will make 
the CLASS program unsustainable.”). 
28. See Hall, supra note 22. 
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penalty payable to the IRS.29 In addition, the Act imposes an “employer 
mandate” that requires employers to offer “affordable” health benefits of 
“minimum value” to all full-time employees and their dependents.30 
Failure may result in penalties against the employer.31 The combined 
effect of the PPACA’s price controls and individual mandate is that 
health-insurance premiums could increase by as much as 100 percent or 
more for some young and healthy households.32  
Given the burden those higher premiums will impose on low-income 
households, the Act offers refundable “premium assistance” tax credits 
to households with incomes between 100 and 400 percent of the federal 
poverty level (FPL).33 The Act further offers “cost-sharing subsidies” 
that enable households between 100 and 250 percent of FPL to obtain, 
at no additional cost to them, more than the mandatory minimum level 
 
29. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 244 (2010). Although styled as a penalty for failure 
to comply with a regulatory mandate, the Supreme Court ultimately 
upheld the penalty as an exercise of the federal government’s taxing power. 
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2600. 
30. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1513, 124 Stat. 119, 254 (2010) (defining an “applicable large employer” 
as one “who employed an average of at least 50 full-time employees on 
business days during the preceding calendar year.”). 
31. Id. 
32. Jonathan Gruber et al., The Impact of the ACA on Wisconsin’s 
Health Insurance Market 24-25 (2011), available at 
http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/aboutdhs/docs/WI-Final-Report-July-18-
2011.pdf (“[P]rior to tax subsidies, 41% of the market will receive a 
premium increase that is higher than 50% . . . . 54% of the members 
receiving greater than a 50% premium increase are age 29 or under.”);  
E-mail correspondence from Dennis Smith, Wisconsin Sec’y of Health 
Servs., to Michael F. Cannon (Jan. 13, 2012) (on file with author) (citing 
supplemental findings from Gruber et al.: “Another way to look at the data 
is to just look at the 1% of single policies that see the highest increases 
after accounting for the tax subsidy. In this case these ‘top’ 1% see an 
average increase of 126%.”); Jeremy D. Palmer et al., Client Report: 
Assist with the First Year of Planning for Design and 
Implementation of a Federally Mandated American Health 
Benefits Exchange 7 (Aug. 31, 2011), available at 
http://www.ohioexchange.ohio.gov/Documents/MillimanReport.pdf (“In 
the individual market, a healthy young male (with benefit coverage at the 
market average actuarial value pre and post-ACA) may experience a rate 
increase of between 90% and 130%.”). 
33. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1401, 124 Stat. 119, 213-14 (2010), amended by Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,  
§ 1001(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1029, 1032 (2010). 
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of coverage.34 This premium assistance, however, is only available for the 
purchase of insurance through Exchanges.35  
These features of the PPACA’s regulatory scheme are inter-
dependent. An apt metaphor is that of a three-legged stool: removing 
any of the three above-mentioned “legs”—the price controls, the 
individual mandate, or the tax credits and subsidies—could cause the 
structure to collapse. Remove the price controls, and premiums for high-
risk households would increase dramatically; those households would 
have a more difficult time complying with the individual mandate. 
Remove either the individual mandate or the tax credits and the Act’s 
price controls would further threaten the viability of health insurance 
markets by pushing low-income/low-risk households to exit the market. 
B. Exchanges, Tax Credits & the Employer Mandate 
Health insurance Exchanges play an essential role in the PPACA’s 
regulatory scheme. As the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) explains, “Exchanges are integral to the Affordable Care Act’s 
goals of prohibiting discrimination against people with pre-existing 
conditions and insuring all Americans.”36 Specifically, Exchanges are 
government agencies that oversee the buying and selling of health 
insurance within a state; monitor carriers’ compliance with the Act’s 
health-insurance price controls; implement measures to mitigate the 
perverse incentives created by the Act’s price controls;37 report to the 
IRS on whether individuals and employers are complying with the 
 
34. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1402, 124 Stat. 119, 221-22 (2010), amended by Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,  
§ 1001(b)(2)(C), 124 Stat. 1029, 1032 (2010). 
35. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. 
36. Ctr. for Consumer Information & Ins. Oversight, Ctrs. for 
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., General Guidance on Federally-
facilitated Exchanges 3 (2012). 
37. Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: A Final Rule on Health 
Insurance Exchanges, Health Affairs Blog (Mar. 13, 2012), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/03/13/implementing-health-reform-a-
final-rule-on-health-insurance-exchanges (explaining that state-run 
Exchanges “must ensure that [qualified health plan] service areas cover at 
least a county except under exceptional circumstances to discourage 
redlining. The final rule QHP standards require QHPs to meet network 
adequacy standards. Specifically, plans must maintain ‘a network that is 
sufficient in number and types of providers, including providers that 
specialize in mental health and substance abuse services, to assure that all 
services will be accessible without unreasonable delay’ and include essential 
community providers. QHPs . . . cannot employ marketing practices or 
benefit designs that will discourage enrollment of individuals with 
significant health needs.”). 
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individual and employer mandates;38 and distribute hundreds of billions 
of dollars in government subsidies to private health insurance 
companies.39  
Like the individual and employer mandates, Exchanges help to limit 
how much of the cost of the Act’s insurance expansion appears in the 
federal budget. By requiring households to give money directly to 
insurance companies, the individual mandate keeps those transactions off 
of the government’s books.40 Likewise, the employer mandate requires 
employers to purchase coverage for their workers, thereby removing 
those transactions from the federal budget and even household budgets.41 
In this way, the PPACA achieves its redistributionist goals off-budget. 
Similarly, Exchanges reduce the Act’s impact on the federal budget 
by limiting eligibility for tax credits and subsidies. Allowing all 
households within the relevant income ranges to claim these entitlements 
would dramatically increase the federal deficit and significantly disrupt 
existing employer-sponsored insurance arrangements. The PPACA’s 
authors therefore offered these entitlements only to certain households 
that purchase a qualified health plan through an Exchange. In addition 
to household-income criteria, individuals are eligible for tax credits only 
 
38. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1311, 124 Stat. 119, 177 (2010). 
39. See Executive Business Meeting to Consider an Original Bill Providing for 
Health Care Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 111th 
Cong. 146 (2009) (statement of Thomas Barthold, Chief of Staff, Joint 
Comm. on Taxation) (“[I]n terms of the direct payment, the mark would 
direct the payments go directly to the insurance provider.”); see also id. 
(testimony of Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget 
Office). 
40. See Michael F. Cannon, The $1.5 Trillion Fraud, National Review 
Online (Nov. 6, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
articles/228551/1-5-trillion-fraud/michael-f-cannon (“President Clinton’s 
ill-fated health plan had an individual mandate, too. Back in 1994, the 
CBO decided that since ‘the mandatory premiums . . . would constitute an 
exercise of sovereign power,’ the agency would treat all premiums as 
federal revenues, including them in the federal budget. That revealed to 
the public the full cost of Clinton’s health plan. Clinton’s secretary of 
health and human services, Donna Shalala, called the CBO’s decision 
‘devastating.’ Journalist Ezra Klein writes that it ‘helped kill the bill.’”); 
see also Michael F. Cannon, Bland CBO Memo, or Smoking Gun?, Cato 
at Liberty (Dec. 16, 2009, 7:49 AM), http://www.cato-at-
liberty.org/bland-cbo-memo-or-smoking-gun (explaining how the PPACA’s 
authors carefully avoided having the CBO include the mandatory 
premiums in federal budgets). 
41. The money employers use to purchase employee health benefits comes out 
of employees’ cash compensation rather than profits. See Jonathan Gruber, 
Health Insurance and the Labor Market, in The Handbook of Health 
Economics 645, 651 (Joseph Newhouse & Anthony Culyer eds., 2000). 
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if they are not Medicaid-eligible and do not receive an offer of “minimum 
value” and “affordable” self-only health coverage from an employer.42 
Offering tax credits and subsidies within Exchanges, however, 
creates an incentive for employers to drop their health benefits so that 
their workers can gain access to those entitlements. If employers did so 
in large numbers, the PPACA’s budgetary footprint would grow.43 The 
employer mandate attempts to prevent such employer “dumping.” It 
penalizes employers with more than fifty workers if they fail to offer 
“minimum value” and “affordable” health benefits to all employees. By 
compelling employers to offer health benefits and thereby restricting 
access to the Exchanges, the employer mandate reduces the federal 
budgetary impact of the Act’s insurance expansion and reduces 
disruption to existing insurance arrangements.44  
 
42. The PPACA defines “minimum value” as coverage with an actuarial value 
of at least 60 percent, and defines “affordable” as when the explicit (i.e., 
employee-paid) portion of the premium for self-only coverage is less than 
9.5 percent of household income. Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401, 124 Stat. 119, 216-17 (2010). According 
to the IRS: 
Consistent with these statutory provisions, the proposed regulations 
provide that an employer-sponsored plan also is affordable for a 
related individual for purposes of section 36B if the employee’s 
required contribution for self-only coverage under the plan does not 
exceed 9.5 percent of the applicable taxpayer’s household income for 
the taxable year, even if the employee’s required contribution for the 
family coverage does exceed 9.5 percent of the applicable taxpayer’s 
household income for the year.  
 Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 76 Fed. Reg. 50,931, 50,935 (Aug. 
17, 2011). 
43. This would also further undermine the claim made by the PPACA’s 
proponents that it would not cause people to lose their existing health 
insurance. See, e.g., Barack Obama Promises You Can Keep Your Health 
Insurance, But There’s No Guarantee, PolitiFact (Aug. 11, 2009), 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2009/aug/11/barack-
obama/barack-obama-promises-you-can-keep-your-health-ins (quoting 
President Barack Obama: “If you like your health care plan, you can keep 
your health care plan.”). 
44. Some analysts predict worker exodus and employer dumping will occur 
despite the PPACA’s attempts to prevent it. Douglas Holtz-Eakin & 
Cameron Smith, Am. Action Forum, Labor Markets & Health 
Care Reform: New Results 2 (2010); see also Cong. Budget Office, 
Updated Estimates for the Insurance Coverage Provisions of 
the Affordable Care Act 3 (2012); Cong. Budget Office, CBO 
and JCT’s Estimates of the Effects of the Affordable Care Act 
on the Number of People Obtaining Employment-Based Health 
Insurance 1 (2012). But see Linda Blumberg et al., Why Employers 
Will Continue to Provide Health Insurance: The Impact of the 
Affordable Care Act 1 (2011). 
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Exchanges, in turn, play an essential role in enforcing the employer 
mandate. Before the IRS may levy a penalty against an employer, (1) 
the employer must fail to offer “minimum value” or “affordable” 
coverage to all full-time employees and their dependents, and (2) one of 
the employer’s full-time employees must enroll in a qualified health plan 
through an Exchange “to which an applicable premium tax credit or 
cost-sharing reduction is allowed or paid with respect to the employee.”45 
If an employer fails to offer “minimum value” coverage, the Act fines the 
employer $2,000 for every full-time employee (after exempting the first 
thirty employees). If an employer offers coverage that is “minimum 
value” but not “affordable,” the Act fines the employer either $3,000 for 
each employee who receives or is eligible for a tax credit through an 
Exchange or the penalty for not offering “minimum value” coverage, 
whichever is less.46 Employer groups have expressed concern about both 
the size and the unpredictability of these penalties.47 
C. Tax Credits & the Individual Mandate 
Exchanges also play a key role in the enforcement of the individual 
mandate. Subject to certain exemptions, the PPACA requires all US 
residents to obtain a minimum level of health insurance coverage or pay 
a tax penalty.48 When fully phased-in by 2016, penalties will be the 
greater of a flat fee of $695 (for single individuals) to $2,085 (families of 
four or more) or 2.5 percent of income in excess of the income-tax filing 
threshold, up to a limit of the nationwide average premium of all 
“bronze” level health plans available to the taxpayer’s age and household 
size.49 One estimate posits that by 2016, the maximum penalty will reach 
 
45. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1513, 124 Stat. 119, 253 (2010). 
46. Id. § 1513, amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1003, 124 Stat. 1029, 1033 (2010). 
47. February Outlook: Business and Health Reform, CoBank, 
http://www.cobank.com/Newsroom-Financials/CoBank-News-Feed/ 
February-Outlook.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (quoting Robert 
Graboyes, Senior Fellow for Health and Economics at the National 
Federation of Independent Business Research Foundation: “What makes it 
very difficult for businesses is that the penalties involve so much that is 
outside of their control or even outside of their view. Let’s say you’re 
married with two children and you and your wife together earn $100,000. 
Now your wife’s income drops a bit, and you’re below $89,000. Your 
employer and your wife’s employer will both be slammed with a fine. I 
have jokingly referred to this as the ‘employee’s spouse’s uncle tax,’ 
because it is literally true that an employer could be fined because one of 
its employees has a spouse who has an elderly uncle who moves into their 
spare bedroom, thereby increasing family size.”). 
48. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242-50 (2010) (adding § 5000A to the IRC). 
49. Id.  
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$7,779 for a single fifty-five year old and $18,085 for a family of four 
with a fifty-five year-old head of household.50 
The Act exempts taxpayers from that penalty if coverage is deemed 
not “affordable,” defined as when the “required contribution” to the cost 
of health insurance exceeds roughly 8 percent of household income.51 In 
the case of a household that does not have an offer of “minimum value” 
and “affordable” coverage from an employer, the “required contribution” 
is the difference between the premium for the lowest-cost plan available to 
the household through an Exchange, and any premium-assistance tax 
credit for which the household is eligible.52  
Importantly, the mere fact that a taxpayer is eligible for premium-
assistance tax credits will deprive many taxpayers of this “affordability” 
exemption. Mere eligibility for a tax credit will bring the individual’s 
“required contribution” below 8 percent of household income, thereby 
subjecting him to penalties.  
D. Tax Credits & State-Run Exchanges  
The PPACA’s authors envisioned that each state would have its 
own Exchange, operated by state officials. As President Obama 
explained shortly after signing the PPACA, “by 2014, each state will set 
up what we’re calling a health insurance exchange.”53 The PPACA does 
not force states to create Exchanges, however. Although the Act declares 
that each state “shall” create an Exchange and lays out rules for state-
run Exchanges,54 it does not and could not mandate that states establish 
one.55 A direct command that state governments assist in the 
implementation of a federal regulatory scheme would be unconstitutional 
 
50. Paul R. Houchens, Measuring the Strength of the Individual 
Mandate 10-11 (2012), http://publications.milliman.com/publications/ 
health-published/pdfs/measuring-strength-individual-mandate.pdf. 
51. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242-50 (2010) (adding § 5000A(e)(1)(A) to the IRC). 
52. Id. (adding § 5000A(e)(1)(B)(ii) to the IRC). 
53. Remarks on Health Insurance Reform in Portland, Maine, 2010 Daily 
Comp. Pres. Doc. 220 (Apr. 1, 2010); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. 
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2673 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“The ACA requires each State to establish a health 
insurance ‘exchange.’”). 
54. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1311, 124 Stat. 119, 173 (2010). 
55. See Jonathan H. Adler, Cooperation, Commandeering, or Crowding Out?: 
Federal Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy,  
20 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 199, 213 (2011); see also Michael F. Cannon, 
Will States Lose Medicaid Funds if They Fail to Create an ObamaCare 
‘Exchange’?, Cato at Liberty (Feb. 6, 2012, 2:04 PM), 
http://www.cato.org/blog/will-states-lose-medicaid-funds-they-fail-create-
obamacare-exchange. 
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commandeering.56 If Congress believes state cooperation is necessary to 
facilitate the implementation of a federal program, it must create 
incentives for state action. The Supreme Court has explained there are 
“a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress 
may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal 
interests.”57 Among other things, the federal government may offer states 
financial assistance or threaten to implement the program directly if the 
state refuses to participate.58 The use of such incentives to induce state 
cooperation is often referred to as “cooperative federalism”59 and is quite 
common. In the PPACA, Congress used such “cooperative” measures to 
encourage state creation of Exchanges. 
Though the Act provides that states “shall” create their own 
exchanges, it actually gives states a choice. Section 1311 declares, “Each 
State shall, not later than January 1, 2014, establish an American 
Health Benefit Exchange (referred to in this title as an ‘Exchange’)” and 
lays out rules for state-run Exchanges.60 If a state fails to create an 
Exchange under Section 1311, the Act directs the federal Department of 
Health and Human Services to create an Exchange for that state.61 
Specifically, Section 1321 requires the HHS Secretary to “establish and 
operate” an Exchange within any state that either fails to create an 
Exchange or fails to implement the PPACA’s health insurance 
regulations to the Secretary’s satisfaction. Section 1321 thus requires a 
federal “fallback” for states that do not create Exchanges of their own.  
 
56. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (“[T]he Federal 
Government may not compel the states to implement, by legislation or 
executive action, federal regulatory programs.”); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution has never been 
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require States to govern 
according to Congress’s instructions.”). 
57. New York, 505 U.S. at 167. 
58. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2602 (“Congress 
may use its spending power to create incentives for States to act in 
accordance with federal policies. But when ‘pressure turns into 
compulsion,’ the legislation runs contrary to our system of federalism.” 
(citation omitted)). 
59. New York, 505 U.S. at 167. (“[W]here Congress has the authority to 
regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized 
Congress’ power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity 
according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal 
regulation. This arrangement . . . has been termed ‘a program of 
cooperative federalism . . . .’” (citation omitted)). 
60. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1311, 124 Stat. 119, 173 (2010). Among the “requirements” for purposes 
of Section 1311, an Exchange must be “a governmental agency or nonprofit 
entity that is established by a State.” Id. § 1311(d)(1).  
61. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152,  
§ 1204, 124 Stat. 1029, 1321 (2010). 
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013 
Taxation Without Representation 
135 
As noted above, the PPACA provides tax credits for the purchase of 
qualifying health insurance plans on such Exchanges. Specifically, Section 
1401 adds a new Section 36B to the Internal Revenue Code that authorizes 
refundable “premium assistance tax credits” for the purchase of qualifying 
health insurance plans in Exchanges established by states under Section 
1311.62 These are “refundable” tax credits, meaning that in many cases the 
credit does not just reduce tax liability but also results in government 
outlays to private insurance companies.63 Section 1402 also authorizes “cost-
sharing” subsidies for the purchase of health insurance plans on Exchanges. 
Congress designed these subsidies to help lower-income households obtain 
more comprehensive coverage.64 Section 1402 makes these direct outlays 
available only where tax credits are available—i.e., through state-run 
Exchanges.65 
III. The IRS Rule 
On August 17, 2011, the IRS proposed a regulation to implement 
Section 36B that would offer premium assistance tax credits through 
federal Exchanges. As proposed by the IRS, the rule provided that 
a taxpayer is eligible for the credit for a taxable year if . . . the 
taxpayer or a member of the taxpayer’s family (1) is enrolled in 
one or more qualified health plans through an Exchange 
established under section 1311 or 1321 of the Affordable Care  
Act . . . .66  
If the tax credits authorized by Section 1401 are to be available without 
regard to whether an insurance plan is purchased through a state-run 
(Section 1311) or federal Exchange (Section 1321), the same will be true 
for cost-sharing subsidies, which Section 1402 makes available wherever 
tax credits are available. Because the receipt of tax credits or cost-
sharing subsidies by workers triggers tax penalties against employers, 
another result of the rule is that it taxes employers who otherwise would 
 
62. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1401, 124 Stat. 119, 172 (2010). 
63. Nonrefundable credits only reduce a taxpayer’s tax liability. For example, 
if a taxpayer has a $5,000 tax liability and is eligible for a $6,000 non-
refundable credit, the credit will wipe out her tax liability, but she will 
receive only $5,000 of benefit rather than the full $6,000. If the credit is 
refundable, however, she receives the full $6,000 benefit: the credit wipes 
out her $5,000 tax liability and the IRS issues her a $1,000 payment. 
64. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1402, 124 Stat. 119, 220-21 (2010). 
65. Id.  
66. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 76 Fed. Reg. 50,931, 50,934 (Aug. 
17, 2011) (emphasis added). 
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be exempt from PPACA’s employer mandate—i.e., employers in states 
that decline to create an Exchange. Because the availability of tax 
credits will reduce the “required contributions” of many taxpayers from 
above 8 percent of household income to below that threshold, the rule 
also taxes many individuals who would otherwise be exempt from the 
individual mandate and denies even more individuals access to low-cost 
“catastrophic plans”—individuals in states that decline to create an 
Exchange.  
The proposed rule did not identify any specific statutory authority 
for the extension of tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies, or the 
imposition of the individual and employer mandates on exempt persons, 
through federal Exchanges. And indeed, the plain text of the PPACA 
does not authorize these actions in federal Exchanges. The rule thus 
amends the tax code by offering tax credits and subsidies not authorized 
by the statute and by taxing individuals and employers whom the 
statute does not authorize the IRS to tax. The IRS’s decision to offer tax 
credits in federal Exchanges, and its rationale for that decision, are 
departures from the agency’s strict adherence to the plain meaning of 
the statute concerning far less consequential matters.67 
 
67. As explained in the Federal Register, 
Commentators requested that the final regulations treat a taxpayer 
whose household income exceeds 400 percent of the FPL for the 
taxpayer’s family size as an applicable taxpayer if, at enrollment, 
the Exchange estimates that the taxpayer’s household income will 
be between 100 and 400 percent of the FPL for the taxpayer’s 
family size and approves advance credit payments. Other 
commentators advocated allowing taxpayers with household 
income above 400 percent of the FPL for their family size to be 
treated as eligible for a premium tax credit for the months before a 
change in circumstances affecting household income occurs or for 
the months for which the taxpayer receives advance payments. The 
final regulations do not adopt these comments because they are 
contrary to the language of section 36B limiting the premium tax 
credit to taxpayers with household income for the taxable year at 
or below 400 percent of the FPL for the taxpayer’s family size. 
. . . .  
Commentators requested that the final regulations allow an 
individual who may be claimed as a dependent by another 
taxpayer to qualify as an applicable taxpayer for a taxable year if, 
for the taxable year, another taxpayer does not claim the 
individual as a dependent. The final regulations do not adopt this 
comment because it is inconsistent with section 36B(c)(1)(D), 
which provides that a premium tax credit is not allowed to any 
individual for whom a deduction under section 151 is ‘‘allowable to 
another taxpayer’’ for the taxable year. 
. . . . 
Commentators requested that the final regulations define eligibility 
for government-sponsored programs as actual enrollment for 
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Ironically, tax reduction is only a minor part of the tax-credit rule’s 
impact. By far, the rule’s largest effect is to increase federal spending. 
Because the tax credits are “refundable” (i.e., individuals with no tax 
liability receive the benefit of a cash payout from the IRS) and the cost-
sharing subsidies are federal payments that also flow directly to private 
health insurance companies, the rule also appropriates federal dollars 
without statutory authority. Those expenditures completely swamp any 
tax reduction. Official projections show 78 percent of the budgetary 
impact of the tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies is new spending, 
with tax reduction accounting for just 22 percent.68 Net of revenue from 
the employer-mandate penalties that those tax credits will trigger, new 
 
individuals suffering from end stage renal disease who become 
eligible for Medicare as a result of their diagnosis. Other 
commentators requested this treatment for any individual suffering 
from an acute illness who becomes eligible for a government-
sponsored program . . . . Section 36B(c)(2)(B) establishes a clear 
structure under which eligibility for government-sponsored 
minimum essential coverage in a given month precludes including 
an individual in a taxpayer’s coverage family for purposes of 
computing the premium assistance amount for that month. In 
keeping with the statutory scheme, the final regulations do not 
adopt these comments. 
. . . .  
Commentators suggested that the final regulations adopt a safe 
harbor for individuals and families who can demonstrate that they 
accurately reported any changes in income or family size to the 
Exchange and that their advance payments were properly 
computed based on the information available at the time the 
payments were made. Commentators suggested that taxpayers who 
experience changes in circumstances during the year, including 
taxpayers whose household income for the taxable year exceeds 400 
percent of the FPL, should be allowed to prorate the repayment 
limitations based on the portion of the year the taxpayer receives 
advance payments. Other commentators asked that taxpayers who 
would experience a hardship as a result of repaying excess advance 
payments be exempt from the repayment requirement or that the 
IRS should disregard changes that cause income to slightly exceed 
400 percent of the FPL. Commentators also suggested that 
taxpayers be allowed to compute their premium tax credit using 
the largest family size of the household during the year rather than 
the family size reported on the tax return. The statute sets forth 
clear rules for reconciling advance credit payments, which are not 
consistent with the suggestions made by the commentators. 
Accordingly, the final regulations do not adopt these comments. 
 Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,377-79, 
30,384 (May 23, 2012) (emphases added). 
68. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Congressional Budget Office, to 
John Boehner, Speaker of the House (July 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43471-hr60 
79.pdf. 
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spending accounts for roughly 90 percent of the rule’s budgetary impact, 
and tax reduction just 10 percent.69 Roughly speaking, for every two 
dollars of tax reduction, the rule triggers one dollar in immediate tax 
increases and eight dollars of deficit spending. Since every dollar of 
deficit spending must eventually be financed through taxes, taxpayers 
will bear the burden of those eight dollars of deficit spending as well. 
The actual cost of the rule cannot be known with certainty, as it 
depends on how many and which states ultimately decline to create an 
Exchange or to implement the law’s Medicaid expansion. But its cost is 
certainly larger than a routine IRS rule.70 Given that the thirty-four 
states that have opted not to establish an Exchange account for two-
thirds of the US population,71 CBO projections through 2023 suggest the 
IRS rule is thus likely to result in more than $600 billion of unauthorized 
spending, $178 billion of unauthorized tax reduction, more than $100 
billion in unauthorized taxes, and to increase federal deficits by some 
$700 billion.72  
After the rule was proposed, commentators and several members of 
Congress raised concerns about the IRS’ apparent lack of statutory 
 
69. Id. 
70. Curiously, the IRS concluded that the rule would not have a significant 
economic effect. See Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 
30,377, 30,385 (May 23, 2012) (“It has been determined that this Treasury 
decision is not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 
12866, as supplemented by Executive Order 13563. Therefore, a regulatory 
assessment is not required.”). Yet by authorizing tax credits in as many as 
thirty-four states without state-run Exchanges, the rule clearly exceeds the 
statutory threshold for significant rules. The rule would seem to qualify as 
a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12,866 and a 
“major rule” under the Congressional Review Act. See Exec. Order No. 
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (Sept. 30, 1993) (defining a “significant 
regulatory action” as a regulation expected to have an annual effect on the 
economy of $100 million or more); 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (2006) (defining a 
major rule as a rule with an anticipated annual cost or economic effect of 
$100 million or more).  
71. Robert Pear, U.S. Officials Brace for Huge Task of Operating Health 
Exchanges, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2012, at A17. 
72. CBO estimates show just 22 percent of the budgetary impact of the 
credits/subsidies is tax reduction, while 78 percent is new spending. Letter 
from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Congressional Budget Office, to John 
Boehner, Speaker of the House 6 (July 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43471-hr6079 
.pdf; and author’s calculations. Thus, new spending accounts for $948 
billion of the $1.2 trillion budgetary impact of the credits/subsidies, while 
tax reduction accounts for just $268 billion. U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
OFFICE, CBO’S FEBRUARY 2013 ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 2 (2013); and 
author’s calculations. 
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authority.73 In response, IRS officials and representatives of both the 
Treasury and HHS Departments insisted such authority was in the Act 
yet cited no specific provisions in support.74 A Treasury Department 
spokeswoman said the Department is “confident that providing tax 
credits to all eligible Americans, no matter where they live and whether 
their state runs the exchange, is consistent with the intent of the law 
and our ability to interpret and implement it.”75  
On November 3, 2011, two dozen members of the House of 
Representatives wrote IRS Commissioner Douglas H. Shulman a letter 
arguing that the proposed rule “contradicts the explicit statutory 
language describing individuals’ eligibility for receipt of these tax 
credits.”76 On November 29, Shulman responded: 
The statute includes language that indicates that individuals are 
eligible for tax credits whether they are enrolled through a State-
based Exchange or a Federally-facilitated Exchange. Additionally, 
neither the Congressional Budget Office score nor the Joint 
 
73. Letter from Rep. David Phil Roe, U.S. House of Representatives, to 
Douglas Shulman, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Service (Nov. 4, 2011), 
available at http://roe.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Letter_to_IRS_ 
Commissioner_regarding_tax_credits_under_PPACA_-_11.03.11.pdf; 
Letter from Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senate, to Timothy Geithner, Sec’y, 
Dep’t of the Treasury and Douglas Shulman, Comm’r, Internal Revenue 
Serv. (Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://finance.senate.gov/ 
newsroom/ranking/download/?id=d8c3f533-132c-4cec-be10-8008402c21d8; 
see also Adler & Cannon, supra note 11. 
74. See, e.g., Letter from Douglas H. Shulman, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv., 
to Rep. David Phil Roe, U.S. House of Representatives (Nov. 29, 2011), 
available at http://roe.house.gov/UploadedFiles/IRS_Response_to_ 
letter_on_PPACA_Exchange.pdf; Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs., State Exchange Implementation Questions and Answers 8 
(2011) [hereinafter State Exchange Implementation]. 
75. Sara Hansard, Private Exchanges Could Impact Success of State 
Exchanges, BNA Health Insurance Report, Oct. 26, 2011.  
76. Letter from Rep. David Phil Roe, U.S. House of Representatives, to 
Douglas Shulman, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. (Nov. 4, 2011), 
available at http://roe.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Letter_to_IRS_ 
Commissioner_regarding_tax_credits_under_PPACA_-_11.03.11.pdf. 
On December 1, Senate Finance Committee ranking member Orrin Hatch 
(R-UT) likewise pressed this issue in a letter to Commissioner Shulman 
and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner. Sam Baker, Hatch: IRS Can’t 
Offer Tax Credits in Federal Insurance Exchange, The Hill (Dec. 1,  
2011, 2:40 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-reform-
implementation/196585-hatch-irs-cant-offer-tax-credits-in-federal-insurance-
exchange; Letter from Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senate, to Timothy 
Geithner, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Treasury and Douglas Shulman, Comm’r, 
Internal Revenue Serv. (Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://finance. 
senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/download/?id=d8c3f533-132c-4cec-be10-
8008402c21d8. 
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Committee on Taxation technical explanation of the Affordable 
Care Act discusses excluding those enrolled through a Federally-
facilitated exchange.77 
On November 29, the Department of Health and Human Services offered 
a similar defense: 
The proposed regulations . . . are clear on this point and supported 
by the statute. Individuals enrolled in coverage through either a 
State-based Exchange or a Federally-facilitated Exchange may be 
eligible for tax credits . . . Additionally, neither the Congressional 
Budget Office score nor the Joint Committee on Taxation 
technical explanation discussed limiting the credit to those 
enrolled through a State-based exchange.78 
Despite the public concerns about the proposed regulations, the IRS 
stayed the course. Late in the afternoon on Friday, May 18, 2012,79 the 
IRS issued a final rule adopting its proposal without significant change.80 
The agency claimed its decision was supported by legislative intent, if 
not the actual language of the Act:  
The statutory language of section 36B and other provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act support the interpretation that credits are 
available to taxpayers who obtain coverage through a State 
Exchange, regional Exchange, subsidiary Exchange, and the 
Federally-facilitated Exchange. Moreover, the relevant legislative 
history does not demonstrate that Congress intended to limit the 
premium tax credit to State Exchanges. Accordingly, the final 
regulations maintain the rule in the proposed regulations because 
 
77. Letter from Douglas H. Shulman, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv., to Rep. 
David Phil Roe, U.S. House of Representatives (Nov. 29, 2011), available at 
http://roe.house.gov/UploadedFiles/IRS_Response_to_letter_on_ 
PPACA_Exchange.pdf (emphasis added). 
78. State Exchange Implementation, supra note 74. 
79. The timing of the release of the final rule by the IRS, however, could be 
recognition that the final rule would not be warmly received. See The Art 
of the Friday News-Dump, National Journal, http://www.national 
journal.com/the-art-of-the-friday-news-dump-20110722 (last updated Nov. 
9, 2012, 3:44 PM) (“When newsmakers release a tidbit on a Friday 
afternoon, chances are, it’s not something that puts them in the best light. 
Stories dumped on Fridays, as the strategy suggests, peter out during the 
weekend—or at least give the subjects more time to craft their 
responses.”). 
80. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,377 (May 
23, 2012) (“Accordingly, the final regulations maintain the rule in the 
proposed regulations because it is consistent with the language, purpose, 
and structure of section 36B and the Affordable Care Act as a whole.”). 
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it is consistent with the language, purpose, and structure of section 
36B and the Affordable Care Act as a whole.81 
On October 12, 2012, the Treasury Department offered this explanation 
of the rule in response to a request from the chairman of the House 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
We interpreted the statutory language in context and consistent 
with the purpose and structure of the statute as a whole, pursuant 
to longstanding and well-established principles of statutory 
construction. For example, ACA section 1311 refers to an 
exchange being “established by a State.” Congress provided in 
section 1321, however that where a state was not proceeding with 
an exchange, HHS would establish and operate “such Exchange 
within the State,” making a federally-facilitated exchange the 
equivalent of a state exchange in all functional respects. Moreover, 
throughout the ACA, Congress refers to the exchanges as 
“exchanges,” “exchanges established by a state,” and “exchanges 
established under the ACA.” There is no discernible pattern that 
suggests Congress intended the particular language in section 
36B(b)(2)(A) to limit the availability of the tax credit. 
In addition, the information reporting requirements of section 
36B(f)(3) apply to exchanges under both ACA sections 1311 and 
1321. This requirement relates to the administration of the 
premium tax credit. The placement of this provision in section 36B 
and the information required to be reported—including 
information related to eligibility for the credit and receipt of 
advance payments—strongly suggests [sic] that all taxpayers who 
enroll in qualified health plans, either through the federally-
facilitated exchange or a state exchange, should qualify for the 
premium tax credit. Our interpretation is consistent with the 
explanation of the ACA released by the non-partisan 
Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation and with the 
assumptions made by the Congressional Budget Office in 
estimating the effects of the ACA.82 
An October 25, 2012, letter from the Treasury Department to the 
chairman reiterated these points and added: 
On September 19, 2012, the Oklahoma Attorney General amended 
an existing civil lawsuit in the Eastern District of Oklahoma to 
 
81. Id. (emphases added). 
82. See Letter from Mark J. Mazur, Assistant Sec’y for Tax Policy, U.S. 
Treasury Dep’t, to Rep. Darrell Issa, Chairman, Committee on Oversight 
and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 12, 2012) 
(on file with authors) (emphasis on “such” in original; all other emphases 
added). 
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include claims challenging Treasury regulations promulgated under 
section 36B. We disagree strongly with these claims, and we 
intend to defend the lawsuit vigorously. Ultimately, however, it 
will be up to the courts to determine the proper interpretation of 
section 36B . . . .83 
These statements are notable for what they do not include. Neither 
agency has identified any statutory language expressly authorizing the 
IRS to issue tax credits through federal Exchanges or authorizing the 
IRS to do so via regulation. For more than a year since the IRS’s 
interpretation was first questioned, these agencies failed to cite any 
statutory language in support of the rule. Instead, the IRS claimed 
various unidentified provisions of the law “support” its interpretation, 
that its rule is “consistent with” the Act, and that the “relevant” 
legislative history does not contradict its interpretation. In October 
2012, Treasury officials ultimately cited a provision of the statute that 
they claim supports that interpretation, yet did not claim that 
interpretation is compelled by the text of the PPACA.  
IV. Text, Legislative History, and  
Congressional Intent 
Notwithstanding the Treasury Department’s recently articulated 
legal theory, the IRS rule lacks statutory authority. The text of the 
PPACA does not authorize the IRS to offer tax credits through federal 
Exchanges. The plain text of the Act precludes it. Section 1401’s 
language restricting tax credits to states that establish an Exchange 
under Section 1311 is clear and unambiguous. Nor can the rule be 
justified on other grounds. The IRS’s position is not supported by the 
structure of the statute, its legislative history, or other indicia of 
congressional intent.84 The remainder of the statute, along with the Act’s 
 
83. See Letter from Alastair M. Fitzpayne, Assistant Sec’y for Legislative 
Affairs, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, to Rep. Darrell Issa, Chairman, Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives 
(Oct. 25, 2012) (on file with authors). 
84. Although this Article often refers to congressional “intent,” a body 
composed of 535 individuals cannot be said to have a single “intent.” This 
is a convenient “shorthand” for how to characterize what is actually the 
result of negotiation, compromise, and deal-making among many 
lawmakers, each of whom may have his or her own specific intent with 
regard to the legislation. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public 
Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of 
Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 Yale L.J. 2, 14 n.25 (2008) 
(“Characterizing the legislature, or the enacting coalition, as a unitary 
actor that ‘knows’ the effect of policies on outcomes and chooses the policy 
that would advance ‘its’ interest is a shorthand way of describing this more 
complex collective choice process.”). Thus, to say that a bill provision was 
intentional is to say that it is a result of this process, and was drafted as 
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legislative history, shows that this restriction was intentional and 
purposeful and that the plain meaning of Section 1401 reflects Congress’ 
intent. The PPACA’s authors strongly preferred state-run Exchanges 
over federal Exchanges, the statute repeatedly uses financial incentives 
to encourage states and others to comply with the Act’s regulatory 
scheme, and the idea of conditioning tax credits on states creating 
Exchanges was part of this debate from the beginning. Both of the 
PPACA’s antecedent bills thus contained the feature of withholding 
subsidies from residents of uncooperative states. The PPACA’s authors 
knew how to provide for Exchanges established by different levels of 
government to operate similarly and did so when that was their intent. 
Similarly, they knew how to authorize tax credits in Exchanges 
established by levels of government other than the states, which they 
also did when that was their intent. During congressional consideration, 
the PPACA’s lead author affirmed that the law conditions tax credits on 
states establishing Exchanges. In addition, the legislative history 
strongly suggests that House Democrats were aware of this feature 
before they approved the PPACA. While PPACA supporters in the 
House and Senate closely scrutinized and repeatedly amended Section 
1401 through the HCERA, they left intact the relevant provisions. 
Finally, even if the foregoing evidence demonstrating that Section 1401 
accurately reflects congressional intent did not exist, PPACA supporters’ 
approval of this text reveals that their intent was indeed to enact a bill 
that restricts tax credits to state-run Exchanges. At no point have 
defenders of the rule identified anything in the legislative history that 
contradicts the plain meaning of Section 1401.  
Professor Timothy Jost has argued the provisions restricting tax 
credits to state-run Exchanges “clearly say what Congress clearly did not 
mean.”85 On the contrary, the PPACA’s authors clearly meant what the 
statute clearly says. 
 
intended by some of those involved in writing and amending the bill, and 
not to claim that every member of Congress who supported a bill desired 
each provision of the bill. This is particularly so given the unfortunate 
tendency of some legislators to not even read the legislation upon which 
they express opinions and cast votes. See generally Hanah Volokh, A Read-
the-Bill Rule for Congress, 76 Mo. L. Rev. 135, 136-38 (2011). 
85. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Yes, the Federal Exchange Can Offer Premium 
Tax Credits, Health Reform Watch (Sept. 11, 2011), 
http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2011/09/11/yes-the-federal-exchange-
can-offer-premium-tax-credits. Cf. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 
249, 253-54 (1992) (“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a 
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”). 
Professor Jost is an authoritative figure on the PPACA and its 
implementation. See Erika Eichelberger, Conservatives Insist Obamacare Is 
on Its Death Bed, Mother Jones (Jan. 24, 2013, 3:06 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/01/obamacare-exchanges-
conservative-cato-freedomworks (“Timothy Jost[] [is] a health care law 
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A. Plain Text 
The starting point for statutory interpretation is the statute’s text.86 
As noted above, the PPACA authorizes two methods for establishing an 
Exchange within a state. Section 1311 provides that “Each State shall, 
not later than January 1, 2014, establish an American Health Benefit 
Exchange (referred to in this title as an ‘Exchange’)” and provides rules 
for state-run Exchanges.87 For purposes of Section 1311, the Act 
specifically requires that an Exchange must be “a governmental agency 
or nonprofit entity that is established by a State.”88 Section 1304(d) 
clarifies, “In this title, the term ‘State’ means each of the 50 States and 
the District of Columbia.”89 
Section 1321 requires the federal government to create an Exchange 
in states that elect not to create their own. Specifically, if a state either 
fails to create an Exchange or fails to implement the PPACA’s health 
insurance regulations to the Secretary’s satisfaction, Section 1321 
requires the HHS Secretary to “establish and operate such Exchange.” 
Section 1321 thus requires a federal “fallback” for states that do not 
create Exchanges of their own. State-run Exchanges created under 
Section 1311 and federal fallback exchanges created under Section 1321 
are distinct. 
Section 1401 authorizes premium-assistance tax credits and makes 
them available only through state-run Exchanges. This section specifies 
 
scholar at the Washington and Lee University School of Law who regularly 
meets with HHS officials on implementation of the legislation . . . .”). 
86. See, e.g., Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 
210 (1979) (“The starting point in any case involving the meaning of a 
statute, is the language of the statute itself.”); Caminetti v. United States, 
242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“It is elementary that the meaning of the statute 
must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is 
framed . . . .”); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2583 (2012) (“[T]he best evidence of Congress’s intent is the 
statutory text.”); Unif. Statute & Rule Constr. Act § 19 (1995) 
(“The text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its 
meaning.”); Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the 
Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (1791), in 8 The Papers 
of Alexander Hamilton 97, 111 (H.C. Syrett ed., 1965) (“[W]hatever 
may have been the intention of the framers of a constitution, or of a law, 
that intention is to be sought for in the instrument itself.”). 
87. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1311, 124 Stat. 119, 173 (2010). 
88. § 1311(d). 
89. § 1304(d). But note that Section 1323 provides: “A territory that  
elects . . . to establish an Exchange in accordance with part II of this 
subtitle and establishes such an Exchange in accordance with such part 
shall be treated as a State for purposes of such part[.]” Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1204, 124 Stat. 1029, 
1055-56 (2010). 
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that taxpayers may receive a tax credit only during a qualifying 
“coverage month,” which occurs only when “the taxpayer is covered by a 
qualified health plan . . . that was enrolled in through an Exchange 
established by the State under section 1311 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act.”90 By its express terms, this provision only applies 
to Exchanges “established by a state” and “established . . . under 
Section 1311.” Section 1401 further emphasizes that tax credits are 
available only through Section 1311 Exchanges when it details the two 
methods for calculating the amount of the credit. The first method bases 
the amount on the premiums of a qualified health plan that the taxpayer 
“enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State under 
[Section] 1311 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.”91 The 
second method bases the amount on the premium of the “second lowest 
cost silver plan . . . which is offered through the same Exchange through 
which the qualified health plans taken into account under [the first 
method] were offered.”92 Both methods therefore require that taxpayers 
obtain coverage through a state-run Exchange. The second method also 
relies on the concept of an “adjusted monthly premium,” which only 
applies to “individual[s] covered under a qualified health plan taken into 
account under paragraph (2)(A)”93—i.e., “through an Exchange 
established by the State under [Section] 1311.”94  
These clauses carefully restrict tax credits to state-created 
Exchanges. They either employ or refer to not one but two limiting 
phrases: “by the State” and “under Section 1311.” Either phrase by itself 
would have been sufficient to limit availability of tax credits to state-run 
Exchanges as (1) states can only establish Exchanges under Section 1311 
and (2) that section provides no authority for any other entity to 
establish Exchanges.95 The repeated use of both phrases makes the 
meaning and effect of the language abundantly clear.96  
 
90. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1401, 124 Stat. 216 (2010). 
91. Id. (emphasis added).  
92. Id. (emphasis added). 
93. Id.  
94. Id. (emphasis added). 
95. Section 1311 does authorize “regional” or other interstate Exchanges that 
“may operate in more than one State if each State in which such Exchange 
operates permits such operation.” Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(f), 124 Stat. 119, 179 (2010). Since 
interstate Exchanges satisfy both the “established by the state” and “under 
section 1311” requirements, Section 1401 authorizes tax credits through 
these Exchanges as well. 
96. Even if one were to conclude that federal Exchanges established under 
Section 1321 could be considered Section 1311 exchanges, they would still 
not be Exchanges “established by a state.” See infra Part V.D. 
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Indeed, Section 1401 either employs or refers to this restrictive 
language a total of seven times.97 Even though the appearance of those 
phrases in the definition of “coverage month” is sufficient to restrict tax 
credits to state-run Exchanges, every reference to Exchanges in Section 
1401’s tax-credit eligibility rules is to an Exchange “established by the 
State under section 1311.” The Act contains no parallel language 
authorizing tax credits in Exchanges established by the federal 
government under Section 1321. Nor does it contain language 
authorizing the IRS to issue tax credits through the “functional 
equivalent” of a Section 1311 Exchange. 
Courts are to “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a 
statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the 
legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.”98 
To treat federal fallback Exchanges as equivalent to state Exchanges 
established under Section 1311 is to ignore the PPACA’s repeated 
reference to Exchanges “established by the State” and render this latter 
language into mere surplusage.99 Further, as Professor James Blumstein 
notes, under the familiar canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 
“the ACA’s granting of subsidies for income-qualified enrollees under 
state exchanges established under Section 1311 is to be construed not to 
grant comparable subsidies for income-qualified enrollees under federal 
exchanges established under Section 1321.”100 
The painstaking repetition of the phrase “established by the State” 
makes the plain meaning of the statute abundantly clear. As the 
Congressional Research Service has written,  
a strictly textual analysis of the plain meaning of the provision 
would likely lead to the conclusion that the IRS’s authority to 
 
97. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1401, 124 Stat. 216 (2010). 
98. Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883); see also Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2583 (2012) (“Where Congress 
uses certain language in one part of a statute and different language in 
another, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally.” (citing 
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). 
99. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (“We are . . . 
‘reluctan[t] to treat statutory terms as surplusage’ in any setting” (citation 
omitted)); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000) (“Judges 
should hesitate . . . to treat statutory terms in any setting as surplusage” 
(citation and internal quotation omitted)). This principle is well 
established and has been articulated repeatedly since the Marshall Court. 
See, e.g., Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 122, 202 (1819). 
100. Implementation of Health Insurance Exchanges and Related Provisions: 
Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, Subcomm. on Health, House of 
Representatives, 112th Cong. (Sept. 5, 2012) (testimony of James F. 
Blumstein), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ 
house_ways_and_means_testimony92112.pdf. 
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issue the premium tax credits is limited only to situations in which 
the taxpayer is enrolled in a state-established exchange. Therefore, 
an IRS interpretation that extended tax credits to those enrolled 
in federally facilitated exchanges would be contrary to clear 
congressional intent, receive no Chevron deference, and likely be 
deemed invalid.101 
 Section 1402 authorizes cost-sharing subsidies for “an individual who 
enrolls in a qualified health plan . . . offered through an Exchange.”102 
This language would appear more inclusive. But Section 1402 also 
stipulates that “[n]o cost-sharing reduction shall be allowed under this 
section with respect to coverage for any month unless the month is a 
coverage month with respect to which a [premium assistance tax] credit 
is allowed to the insured . . . .”103 In other words, Section 1402 explicitly 
and exclusively ties cost-sharing subsidies to premium-assistance tax 
credits, which Section 1401 explicitly and exclusively ties to state-run 
Exchanges created under Section 1311.  
There is a discernible pattern here. Congress tightly crafted the 
eligibility rules for premium-assistance tax credits and cost-sharing 
subsidies so that they would be conditioned on each state’s 
implementation of an Exchange. The statute provides no authority for 
the IRS to offer either entitlement through federal Exchanges created 
under Section 1321. Because cost-sharing subsidies are available only 
where premium-assistance tax credits are available, the discussion below 
will focus primarily on tax credits. 
The remainder of the statute shows this choice was intentional. 
Section 1421 authorizes tax credits for certain small businesses that offer 
to make “a nonelective contribution on behalf of each employee who 
enrolls in a qualified health plan offered to employees by the employer 
through an exchange.”104 Just as the eligibility rules for premium-
 
101. Memorandum from Jennifer Staman & Todd Garvey, Cong. Research 
Serv., Legal Analysis of Availability of Premium Tax Credits in State and 
Federally Created Exchanges Pursuant to the Affordable Care Act 8 (July 
23, 2012), available at http://www.statereforum.org/sites/default/files/ 
premium_credits_and_federally_created_exchanges_copy.pdf. But note 
the CRS qualified that conclusion: “However, given the . . . alternative 
interpretive arguments that may suggest a more inclusive construction—
including legislative history, legislative purpose, and context—a more 
searching analysis of Congress’s intent in enacting the provision may lead 
to a less clear result.” Id. We discuss those alternative arguments below. 
102. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1402, 124 Stat. 119, 221 (2010) (emphasis added). 
103. Id. (emphasis added). 
104. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1421, 124 Stat. 119, 237-42 (2010) (emphasis added). We are indebted to 
Adriane Crouse, Assistant Director, Division of Research, Missouri Senate, 
and Missouri Sen. Robert Schaaf for bringing the small-business tax credit 
language to our attention. Letter from Adriane Crouse, Assistant Director, 
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assistance tax credits consistently refer to Exchanges “established by a 
State under section 1311,” Section 1421 also uses consistent language 
when referring to Exchanges in the rules governing small-business tax 
credits. The word “exchange” appears four times in Section 1421. Each 
reference is to “an exchange,” a phrase that encompasses both state-
created Exchanges (Section 1311) and federal Exchanges (Section 1321). 
The contrast between Sections 1401 and 1421 reinforces the plain 
meaning of the language limiting premium-assistance tax credits to 
Exchanges “established by the State under section 1311.” As surely as 
the PPACA makes small-business tax credits available through both 
state-established and federal Exchanges, it offers premium-assistance tax 
credits solely through the former.  
B. Preference for State-Run Exchanges 
The language, structure, legislative history, and congressional debate 
over the PPACA demonstrate that its authors preferred state-run 
Exchanges to federal Exchanges. From the outset, the Act directs states 
to establish Exchanges, and many of the PPACA’s supporters presumed 
that all states would create Exchanges of their own.  
The text of the PPACA suggests that Congress sought universal 
state cooperation. Section 1311(b) provides that “each state shall . . . 
establish an American Health Benefit Exchange” by 2014.105 The Act 
further details various requirements state-run Exchanges must meet. 
This was not accidental. The Senate Finance Committee, where the 
relevant PPACA language originated, wrestled with the question of 
whether states or the federal government should take the lead in 
creating Exchanges. A November 2008 “white paper” issued by 
Chairman Max Baucus (D-MT) endorsed a single, federal Exchange: 
“The Baucus plan would ensure that every individual can access 
affordable coverage by creating a nationwide insurance pool called the 
Health Insurance Exchange.”106 The committee subsequently heard 
testimony from a broad coalition endorsing state-run rather than  
federal Exchanges.107 When Sen. Baucus introduced his “Chairman’s 
 
Division of Research, to Senator Robert Schaaf, Missouri Senate (Nov. 13, 
2012) (on file with authors).  
105. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1311(b), 124 Stat. 119, 173 (2010) (emphasis added). 
106. Max Baucus, Call to Action: Health Reform 2009 iv (Nov. 12, 
2008). 
107. Those testifying before the Committee included Stuart M. Butler, Director 
of the Center for Policy Innovation at The Heritage Foundation: 
There is broad support for the concept of a health insurance 
exchange to improve the functioning of a competitive market for 
plans . . . . But should an exchange be at the national level, or at 
the state level, and should there be overlapping exchanges? A 
national exchange may seem attractive but it is accompanied by 
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Mark” in September 2009, it directed states to establish Exchanges and 
provided for a federal fallback Exchange.108 Advocates of state-
 
many problems . . . . The solution would be for the federal 
government to do two things. First, set out broad objectives for 
exchanges, and allow states to propose designs for state or  
regional exchanges to be certified by the federal government.  
 Roundtable Discussion on Expanding Health Care Coverage: Before the S. 
Comm on Finance, 111th Cong. 2 (May 5, 2009) (testimony of Stuart M. 
Butler, Vice President, Heritage Foundation), available at 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Stuart%20Butler.pdf.  
 Len M. Nichols, Director of the Health Policy Program at The New 
America Foundation: 
Do note, however, these new exchanges could be organized at the 
state or even substate levels. It is not necessary (or wise) to have 
one national exchange/marketplace . . . . Insurance market rules 
governing the new marketplaces should be uniform across the 
country, but the exchanges themselves could be organized on a 
national, state, or sub-state level. It is important to remember that 
all health markets (like politics) are local. Competing against 
Kaiser in San Francisco or Group Health in Seattle is different 
than competing against Blue Cross of Arkansas in  
Little Rock. Exchange managers and oversight boards can and 
should bring local expertise and flexibility to the overall federal 
superstructure.” 
 Roundtable Discussion on Expanding Health Care Coverage: Before the S. 
Comm on Finance, 111th Cong. 4 (May 5, 2009) (testimony of Len M. 
Nichols, Director, New America Foundation Health Policy Program), 
available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Len%20 
Nichols.pdf. 
 Scott Serota, President and CEO of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
Association: 
[C]reating a federal ‘connector’ would be complex, costly and time-
consuming. Creation of a federal connector could also undermine 
state regulation and authority, creating conflicting federal-state 
rules that would result in regulatory confusion and adverse 
selection. A state-based approach would accomplish the goals of a 
federal connector while ensuring current consumer protections 
afforded by state oversight and assuring faster implementation at 
lower costs by avoiding the creation of a new federal bureaucracy. 
To encourage states to establish State Insurance Marts, federal 
funding should be provided to offset the cost of development. 
 Roundtable on Health Care Coverage: Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 
111th Cong. 6 (May 5, 2009) (testimony of Scott Serota, President and 
CEO, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association), available at 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Scott%20Serota.pdf. 
108. S. Comm. on Finance, 111th Cong., America’s Healthy Future 
Act of 2009 11 (Chairman’s Mark 2009) (“States must establish an 
exchange that complies with the requirements set forth in the Federal law. 
If a state does not establish an exchange within 24 months of enactment, 
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established Exchanges prevailed in the Finance Committee and later in 
both chambers of Congress. It is unlikely that the PPACA would have 
passed the Senate without this provision.109 
The congressional debate over the PPACA and its antecedents 
correspondingly emphasized state-run Exchanges over federal Exchanges. 
We surveyed eight Senate committee hearings and markups,110 the 
Finance Committee Chairman’s Mark of the America’s Healthy Future 
Act of 2009,111 and the House and Senate floor debates over the 
PPACA.112 In those venues, Democratic members of Congress and their 
staffs made 117 references to “state Exchanges” or state-established 
Exchanges, three references to federal Exchanges, and 359 non-specific 
references to Exchanges. Republican members of Congress, all of whom 
opposed the PPACA, mentioned state or state-established Exchanges 
forty-one times and federal Exchanges seven times in these venues. The 
emphasis on state-run Exchanges reflects the PPACA’s emphasis. When 
Republicans spoke of federal Exchanges, it was typically to raise the 
specter of a federal takeover of health care—a specter that PPACA 
supporters downplayed by emphasizing that Exchanges would be created 
 
the Secretary of HHS shall contract with a non-governmental entity to 
establish a state exchange that complies with the Federal legislation.”).  
109. See Carrie Budoff Brown, Nelson: National Exchange a Dealbreaker, 
Politico (Jan. 25, 2010, 7:59 PM), http://www.politico.com/ 
livepulse/0110/Nelson_National_exchange_a_dealbreaker.html; Patrick 
O’Connor & Carrie Budoff Brown, Nancy Pelosi’s Uphill Health Bill Battle, 
Politico (Jan. 9, 2010, 9:58 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/ 
stories/0110/31294.html. 
110. Healthcare Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor 
& Pensions, 111th Cong. 8-10 (2009); What Women Want: Equal Benefits 
for Equal Premiums: Full Comm. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, 
Education, Labor & Pensions, 111th Cong. (2009); Affordable Health 
Choices Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & 
Pensions; 111th Cong. (2009); Open Executive Session to Consider an 
Original Bill Providing for Health Care Reform: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Finance, 111th Cong. (2009); The President’s Fiscal Year 2010 
Health Care Proposals: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 111th 
Cong. (2009); Covering the Uninsured: Making Health Insurance Markets 
Work: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. (2008); High 
Health Care Costs: A State Perspective: Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 
110th Cong. (2008); Health Care Reform: An Economic Perspective: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. (2008).  
111. S. Comm. on Finance, 111th Cong., America’s Healthy Future 
Act of 2009 (Chairman’s Mark 2009). 
112. We searched the Congressional Record during the periods that each 
chamber was considering the PPACA—the Senate Record between June 1, 
2009 and March 30, 2010, and the House Record between January 19, 2010 
and March 22, 2010. 
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and run by the states.113 Further reflecting the Act’s preference for state-
run Exchanges, the Joint Committee on Taxation’s technical explanation 
of the revenue provisions in the PPACA and HCERA made fifteen 
references to state Exchanges, zero references to federal Exchanges, and 
fifty-one non-specific Exchange references.114 
C. Financial Incentives 
Further evidence of this preference is that the PPACA’s authors 
created large financial incentives to encourage states to establish 
Exchanges. The Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to provide unlimited funding for states to cover the start-up 
costs of establishing Exchanges.115 As of January 2013, the Secretary had 
issued a total of $3.526 billion in Exchange grants to states.116 The 
Secretary has announced these “start-up” grants will be available 
through 2019.117 In contrast, the PPACA’s authors failed to authorize 
any funding for HHS to create federal Exchanges.118 Unlimited start-up 
grants and a lack of funding for federal Exchanges appear not only in 
 
113. See, e.g., Senate Democratic Policy Comm., Fact Check: 
Responding to Opponents of Health Insurance Reform (Sept. 21, 
2009), available at http://dpc.senate.gov/reform/reform-factcheck-
092109.pdf (“There is no government takeover or control of health care in 
any senate health insurance reform legislation . . . All the health insurance 
exchanges, which will create choice and competition for Americans’ 
business in health care, are run by states.”). 
114. Joint Comm. on Taxation, Technical Explanation of the Revenue 
Provisions of the “Reconciliation Act of 2010,” as Amended, In 
Combination with the “Patient Protection and Accordable Care 
Act” (2010). 
115. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1311, 124 Stat. 119, 177-78 (2010); see Memorandum from the Cong. 
Research Serv., Federal Grants For Planning and Establishment of Health 
Insurance Exchanges Under Section 1311(a) of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (Feb. 7, 2011). 
116. Total Health Insurance Exchange Grants, 2013, The Henry J. Kaiser 
Family Foundation: Kaiser State Health Facts, http://www.state 
healthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=964&cat=17 (noting $3,533,977,252 
has been awarded as of March 1, 2013). 
117. See Michael F. Cannon, HHS Offers to Pay Six Years of Operating Costs 
for Some States’ ObamaCare Exchanges, Cato at Liberty (July 3, 2012, 
4:13 PM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/hhs-offers-to-pay-six-years-of-
operating-costs-for-some-states-obamacare-exchanges/. 
118. See Michael F. Cannon, President’s Budget Shows Feds Can’t Create 
ObamaCare ‘Exchanges’, Cato at Liberty (Feb. 13, 2012, 5:08 PM), 
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/presidents-budget-shows-feds-cant-create-
obamacare-exchanges; J. Lester Feder, Sebelius: Exchange Funding Request 
was Anticipated, Politico Pro (Feb. 14, 2012), https://www.politico 
pro.com/go/?id=9220 (subscription only). 
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the PPACA but also in both antecedent bills reported by the Finance 
and HELP committees.119  
Making credits and subsidies available solely through state-run 
Exchanges is consistent with the PPACA’s modus operandi of using 
financial incentives to elicit a desired behavior. Under the Act, 
individuals who fail to obtain health insurance must pay a penalty. 
Large employers that fail to offer required health benefits likewise must 
pay a penalty.  
Many statutes seek to encourage state cooperation by threatening to 
cut off funding to recalcitrant states.120 The PPACA contains this 
feature in other provisions such as the Medicaid expansion.121 Under the 
Act as passed, states that failed to expand their Medicaid programs to 
those below 138 percent of the federal poverty level would have lost all 
federal Medicaid grants, which account for 12 percent of state 
revenues.122 The Act imposes a “maintenance of effort” requirement on 
states’ Medicaid programs that only lifts upon certification of an 
Exchange “established by the State under section 1311.” 
States that opt to establish an Exchange may receive unlimited 
start-up funds from HHS if, “as determined by the Secretary,” the state 
makes adequate progress toward establishing an Exchange, implements 
other parts of the Act, and “meet[s] such other benchmarks as the 
Secretary may establish.”123 This feature—conditioning the continued 
availability of start-up funds on state cooperation—appears in the HELP 
committee bill as well.124 It is hardly a departure for the Act to condition 
 
119. America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009, S. 1796, 111th Cong. § 2237(c) 
(2009); see Affordable Health Choices Act, S. 1679, 111th Cong.  
§ 3101(a) (2009). 
120. See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative 
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” 
Doesn’t, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 813, 858-65 (1998). 
121. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2581-82 (2012) 
(describing the Medicaid expansion).  
122. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 2001, 124 Stat. 119, 271-75 (2010). Even after the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in NFIB v. Sebelius invalidating this requirement, the Act conditions new 
federal Medicaid grants on states expanding their Medicaid programs. 
Cindy Mann et al., Medicaid and State Budgets: Looking at the 
Facts 1 (2008), http://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/ 
Medicaid-state-budgets-2007.pdf (“It is often reported that states spend, on 
average, almost 22 percent of their state budgets on Medicaid, but this 
figure can be misleading because it considers federal as well as state funds. 
On average, federal funds account for 56.2 percent of all Medicaid 
spending.”). 
123. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1311(d)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 176 (2010). 
124. The Finance Committee bill contained language almost identical to the 
PPACA. The HELP Committee bill explicitly withheld credits from 
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the availability of tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies on state 
cooperation.  
The language in Sections 1401 and 1402 restricting credits and 
subsidies to state-created Exchanges is more than just consistent with 
the rest of the Act. It is integral to Section 1311’s directive that states 
“shall” create an Exchange. Because it likely creates a larger financial 
incentive than the Medicaid “maintenance of effort” requirement, it is 
the primary sanction imposed on states that do not establish 
Exchanges.125 It thus animates Section 1311’s “shall.” To ignore it as the 
IRS has would sap that directive of most of its force.  
As noted above, the federal government cannot actually force states 
to create Exchanges, as this would constitute unconstitutional 
commandeering.126 The federal government can, however, utilize a 
combination of positive and negative incentives to induce state 
cooperation—in this case, subsidies for creating Exchanges and the 
threat of a federally run Exchange if a state does not create its own. 
Such incentives are common. Various federal programs, including 
Medicaid, condition the receipt of federal funding on state acceptance of 
the federal government’s conditions.127 In this context, limiting the 
availability of tax credits to insurance purchased in state-run Exchanges 
can be seen as just one more inducement for state cooperation: the 
PPACA threatens states with the loss of tax credits for state residents if 
they do not create an Exchange.128 
 
residents of states that refused or were slow to create their own health 
insurance Gateways. S. 1679, § 3104(d)(2). 
125. The PPACA’s “maintenance of effort” provision requires states to maintain 
aspects of their Medicaid programs as they were in 2010, which can be a 
costly proposition, and only lifts this requirement once “the Secretary 
determines that an Exchange established by the State under section 1311 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is fully operational.” See 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(74), (a)(gg). There are real questions about whether 
the maintenance-of-effort provisions are enforceable under NFIB v. 
Sebelius, in which the Supreme Court held that Congress may not impose 
retroactive conditions on federal Medicaid funds or condition those funds 
on state participation in a new program. See, e.g., Ralph Lindeman, 
PPACA Opponents Eyeing New Challenge To Law’s Maintenance-of-Effort 
Requirement, BNA Health L. Rep. (Oct. 26, 2012), available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/moe-challenge---bna-article-1.pdf. 
126. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. 
127. Additional examples include the No Child Left Behind Act, the Safe 
Drinking Water Act, and the Clean Air Act. 
128. The PPACA is not the first law to offer to reduce the tax burden on 
private parties in order to encourage state cooperation with federal policy. 
In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), the Supreme Court 
upheld federal legislation “predicating tax abatement on a State’s adoption 
of a particular type of unemployment policy.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012); see also New York v. United States, 
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This idea of using conditional tax credits to avoid the 
commandeering problem was also part of the health care reform debate 
well before PPACA supporters first introduced any legislation. In early 
2009, Professor Jost wrote: 
Congress cannot require the states to participate in a federal 
insurance exchange program by simple fiat. This limitation, 
however, would not necessarily block Congress from establishing 
insurance exchanges. Congress could invite state participation in a 
federal program, and provide a federal fallback program to 
administer exchanges in states that refused to establish complying 
exchanges. Alternatively it could exercise its Constitutional 
authority to spend money for the public welfare (the “spending 
power”), either by offering tax subsidies for insurance only in 
states that complied with federal requirements (as it has done with 
respect to tax subsidies for health savings accounts) or by offering 
explicit payments to states that establish exchanges conforming to 
federal requirements.129 
D. Antecedent Bills  
Both the Finance bill and the HELP bill withheld subsidies from 
taxpayers whose state governments failed to establish an Exchange or 
otherwise failed to implement the bills’ requirements.  
The PPACA’s closest antecedent was the Finance Committee-
reported “America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009” (S. 1796).130 The 
relevant language in the PPACA is nearly identical to that of the 
Finance bill. Indeed, the four ways Section 1401 confines tax credits to 
state-run Exchanges appear almost verbatim in the Finance bill.131  
 
505 U.S. 144 (1992) (upholding law that authorized surcharges on 
importation of low-level radioactive waste from noncompliant states). 
129. Timothy S. Jost, Health Insurance Exchanges: Legal Issues, O’Neill 
Institute, Georgetown University Legal Center, no. 23, April 27, 2009, 
available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1022&context=ois_papers (emphasis added). The earliest known 
version of this paper was posted online on January 1, 2009,  
by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/en/research-publications/find-rwjf-research/2009/ 
01/health-insurance-exchanges.html. 
130. Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress, S. 1796, Thomas, Library  
of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN01796: 
@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 25, 2013); America’s Healthy Future 
Act of 2009, S. 1796, 111th Cong. (2009). 
131. Like the PPACA, the Finance bill would have created a new Section 36B 
in the Internal Revenue Code that offers two methods for determining the 
amount of a taxpayer’s premium assistance tax credit. Under the first 
method, found in Section 36B(b)(2)(A)(i), the bill bases the credit amount 
on the premiums for health plans “which were enrolled in through an 
Exchange established by the State under subpart B of title XXII of the 
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The HELP bill even more explicitly withheld credits in states that 
failed to implement its requirements, and it employed that strategy to 
encourage state cooperation even if the federal government created the 
Exchange. If a state sought to establish its own “Gateway” (i.e., 
Exchange) then the HELP bill provided that “any resident of that State 
who is an eligible individual shall be eligible for credits”—but only after 
the Secretary determined that the state had (1) created a qualified 
Gateway, (2) enacted legislation imposing various health insurance 
regulations on the state’s individual and small-group markets, and (3) 
enacted legislation subjecting its state and local governments to the bill’s 
employer mandate. If a state failed to meet these criteria, its residents 
would be ineligible for credits.132 When an “establishing state” fell out of 
compliance, the HELP bill went so far as to revoke credits that state 
residents had already been receiving.133  
If a state formally requested that HHS establish a Gateway for the 
state (such states were called “participating states”), the HELP bill 
authorized the federal government to do so and authorized credits within 
the federal Gateway. But the bill again withheld those credits if the 
state failed to satisfy (2) or (3).  
If state officials opted neither to be an “establishing state” nor a 
“participating state,” then the HELP bill again authorized the federal 
government to create a Gateway for the state, authorized credits within 
that federal Gateway, imposed the bill’s health insurance regulations on 
the state, and deemed the state to be a “participating state.” However, 
the bill still withheld credits unless state officials complied with (3) as 
well.134  
 
Social Security Act,” a clear and exclusive reference to state-run 
Exchanges. America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009, S. 1796, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (emphasis added). But note there is no “subpart B” of the proposed 
title XXII. The parts in that title take capital letters while the subparts 
take numbers. Because Part B of the proposed title XXII directs states to 
create Exchanges, however, this appears to be an immaterial scrivener’s 
error. The second method uses the “adjusted monthly premium” for “the 
second lowest cost silver plan in the individual market which . . . is offered 
through the same exchange . . . .” S. 1796 § 1205(a) (emphasis added). The 
definition of “adjusted monthly premium” again refers to “qualified health 
benefits plan taken into account under paragraph (2)(A)(i) . . . .” Id. 
(emphasis added). Finally, the bill also ties “coverage months” to state-run 
Exchanges by defining them as months in which a taxpayer “is covered by 
a qualified health benefits plan described in subsection (b)(2)(A)(i).” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
132. See Affordable Health Choices Act, S. 1679, 111th Cong. § 3104(d) (2009). 
133. § 3104(b)(2) (“If the Secretary determines that a State has failed to 
maintain compliance with such requirements, the Secretary may revoke the 
determination,” thereby revoking eligibility for credits). 
134. § 3104(d). 
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This history demonstrates that restricting tax credits to state-run 
Exchanges was a deliberate policy choice. The authors of these 
provisions sought to limit the availability of credits to state-run 
Exchanges. The PPACA, the Finance bill, and the HELP bill all 
explicitly withheld credits from individuals as a means of encouraging 
state officials to implement the law. None of the three bills allowed 
residents of a state to receive credits absent cooperation by state 
officials. Some PPACA supporters may have preferred to provide tax 
credits for the purchase of health insurance in federally run Exchanges, 
but other proponents felt otherwise. It is the latter group that prevailed. 
E. Authorial Intent 
Statements by one of the PPACA’s primary authors, Senate  
Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, provide additional evidence 
that the language of Section 1401 conditioning tax credits on a state 
establishing an Exchange was no accident.  
During Finance Committee deliberations over the Baucus bill, which 
became the PPACA without pertinent alteration, Sen. John Ensign (R-
NV) asked Baucus, “How do we [in this committee] have jurisdiction 
over changing state laws on coverage,” such as through the bill’s 
requirements that states establish Exchanges and adopt the bill’s 
insurance regulations, when such matters are “only in the jurisdiction of 
the HELP Committee and not in the jurisdiction of this committee?” 
Baucus responded that the bill conditions the availability of tax credits 
on states complying with those directives.135 Specifically, Senator Baucus 
explained that the requirements Ensign mentioned are among the 
“conditions to participate in the Exchange,” and that “an Exchange . . . 
essentially is tax credits,” which “are in the jurisdiction of this 
committee.”136 In other words, the reason the Finance Committee could 
 
135. Indeed, Section 1321 requires the Secretary to establish an Exchange 
within a state if a state fails to create one itself, or if the state fails to 
adopt the Act’s insurance regulations. Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1321(c), 124 Stat. 119, 186 (2010). The 
Act therefore conditions tax credits on states adopting those regulations as 
well. 
136. In this colloquy, excerpted and lightly edited here, Sen. Baucus backs into 
an admission that his bill conditions tax credits on state officials creating 
an Exchange:  
Senator Ensign: [Is] the underlying premise in this bill that . . . we 
are making states change their laws, their coverage laws? Aren’t 
we doing that? And so why would not most of the coverage rules 
in this bill, underlying bill, be . . . only in the jurisdiction of the 
HELP Committee and not in the jurisdiction of this committee? . . 
. On certain minimum plans, exchanges. All those coverage things 
are state laws . . . How do we have jurisdiction over changing state 
laws on coverage? . . .  
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impose requirements on state-run Exchanges was because tax credits 
were conditional on state compliance. 
Conditioning the tax credits on state compliance provided the 
jurisdictional hook the Committee needed to direct states to create 
Exchanges and otherwise alter their health insurance laws. If the 
Finance Committee bill had authorized tax credits in both state-run and 
federal Exchanges, then the Committee would not have had jurisdiction 
to impose regulatory requirements on state-run Exchanges. The 
operation of state Exchanges would have been outside the Committee’s 
bailiwick and arguably immune from federal oversight altogether.137 The 
fact that Section 1401 provided the Finance Committee this 
jurisdictional hook further demonstrates that the PPACA’s authors 
intentionally restricted tax credits to state-run Exchanges.  
It is irrelevant that the need for that jurisdictional hook evaporated 
when the Finance bill cleared committee or that other members of 
Congress may have preferred a different outcome. The text that the 
Finance Committee approved is the text that the House and Senate 
passed and that the president signed. Nor is it plausible to argue the IRS 
rule is justified because congressional intent subsequently changed; the 
language did not.138  
In our extensive search of the PPACA’s legislative history, this 
comment by Sen. Baucus is the only instance we found of a member of 
Congress discussing whether tax credits would be available in federal 
Exchanges. Like all other relevant aspects of the legislative history, it 
 
The Chairman:  There are conditions to participate in the 
Exchange. 
Senator Ensign: That’s right. 
The Chairman:  For setting up an Exchange. 
Senator Ensign: These would be conditions to participate— 
The Chairman:  And states—an Exchange is, essentially is tax 
credits. Taxes are the jurisdiction of this committee. 
 Executive Committee Meeting to Consider Health Care Reform: Before the 
S. Comm. on Finance, 111th Cong. 326 (2009), available at 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/download/?id=c6a0c668-
37d9-4955-861c-50959b0a8392; see also Executive Committee Meeting to 
Consider an Original Bill Providing for Health Care Reform: Before the S. 
Comm. on Finance, C-SPAN (starting at 2:53:21) (Sept. 23, 2009), 
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/289085-4.  
137. As noted above, the federal government cannot commandeer state 
governments to implement federal policy. By the same token, the federal 
government cannot direct state governments qua state governments. 
Absent the creation of federal incentives, the only inducement for state 
cooperation would be the threatened creation of a federal Exchange. 
138. As noted below, several revisions were made to Section 1401 through the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, yet the language relevant 
here was not changed. See infra notes 142-52 and accompanying text. 
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flatly contradicts the IRS’s position. In contrast, the IRS and its 
defenders have identified nothing from the legislative history that 
supports the IRS rule. Senator Baucus’s own words show both that the 
plain meaning of Section 1401 accurately reflects congressional intent 
and that the IRS rule undermines congressional intent by discouraging 
states from creating Exchanges. 
F. Non-Equivalence 
Further evidence that the plain meaning of Section 1401 reflects 
congressional intent is that PPACA supporters knew how to craft 
language ensuring that Exchanges created by different levels of 
government would operate identically, yet opted not to create such 
equivalence with respect to the availability of tax credits in state-run 
versus federal Exchanges. 
Contrary to the Treasury Department’s claim that the Act makes “a 
federally-facilitated exchange the equivalent of a state exchange in all 
functional respects,” the Act does not provide that an Exchange 
established by the federal government under Section 1321 is a Section 
1311 Exchange, shall be considered a Section 1311 Exchange, or is 
functionally equivalent to a Section 1311 Exchange. Instead, Title I of 
the Act imposes various requirements on state-created Exchanges which 
Section 1321 incorporates and imposes on federal Exchanges by 
reference. First, Section 1321(a) mentions “the requirements under this 
title . . . with respect to the establishment and operation of Exchanges . 
. . and such other requirements as the Secretary determines 
appropriate.”139 Section 1321(c) then provides that if a state either fails 
to create an Exchange or to implement the Act’s health  
insurance regulations to the Secretary’s satisfaction, “the Secretary  
shall . . . establish and operate such Exchange within the State  
and . . . take such actions as are necessary to implement such other 
requirements.” Section 1321 does not deem Exchanges established by the 
federal government to have been established under Section 1311. It takes 
the requirements imposed on state-created Exchanges and incorporates 
them into Section 1321. Section 1311 and Section 1321 remain distinct. 
Nor does Section 1321 create full equivalence between Exchanges 
established by the federal government and those established by states. 
Section 1321 instead imposes on federal Exchanges the same 
requirements that Title I imposes on state-created Exchanges. Those 
requirements include the eligibility restrictions (contained in Section 
1401) that Title I imposes on premium-assistance tax credits. In no way 
does Section 1321 alter or conflict with those restrictions.  
Moreover, the language of Section 1321 is a far cry from the explicit 
Exchange-equivalence language found in the health care bills Congress 
 
139. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1321(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 172 (2010). 
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rejected and elsewhere in the PPACA. The House-passed “Affordable 
Health Care for America Act” (H.R. 3962), for example, created a single 
federal Exchange for all states and allowed states to opt out by creating 
their own Exchanges. To ensure that certain aspects of state-run and 
federal Exchanges would operate in an identical manner, H.R. 3962 
contained the following language: “any references in this subtitle to the 
Health Insurance Exchange or to the Commissioner in the area in which 
the State-based Health Insurance Exchange operates shall be deemed a 
reference to the State-based Health Insurance Exchange and the head of 
such Exchange, respectively.”140  
The HELP bill likewise contained explicit equivalence language: “A 
Gateway shall be a governmental agency or nonprofit entity that is 
established by a State, in the case of an establishing State . . .; or the 
Secretary, in the case of a participating State[.]”141 Even with this 
language, as discussed above, the HELP bill allowed for state and federal 
Gateways to function differently based on a state’s level of cooperation, 
as it explicitly withheld subsidies in non-compliant states.  
The PPACA contains full-equivalence language, but not with regard 
to federal Exchanges. The Act provides that Exchanges established by 
US territories shall be fully equivalent to state-run Exchanges. Section 
1323, as added by HCERA, provides that “[a] territory that elects . . . to 
establish an Exchange in accordance with part II of this subtitle”—Part 
II includes Section 1311, but not Section 1321—“and establishes such an 
Exchange in accordance with such part shall be treated as a State for 
purposes of such part[.]”142 Section 1323 also explicitly authorizes and 
appropriates funds for “premium and cost-sharing assistance to residents 
of the territory obtaining health insurance coverage through the 
Exchange[.]”143 This language shows PPACA supporters knew how to 
create full equivalence between Section 1311 Exchanges and other 
Exchanges, particularly with regard to tax credits and cost-sharing 
subsidies, when that was their intent. Congress created full functional 
equivalence for Exchanges established by federal territories but not for 
exchanges established by the federal government.144 
 
140. Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong.  
§ 308(e) (2009). 
141. Affordable Health Choices Act, S. 1697, 111th Cong. § 3101(b) (2009). 
142. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152,  
§ 1204, 124 Stat. 1029, 1055 (2010). 
143. § 1204(b). 
144. As a general rule, if Congress adopts particular language in one part of a 
statute, but omits it in another, it is presumed Congress acted 
“intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” See 
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citing United States v. 
Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)). 
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The HCERA also added information-reporting requirements to the 
Act.145 These provisions explicitly require both Section 1311 Exchanges 
and Section 1321 Exchanges to report an array of information pertaining 
to the purchase of health insurance plans, including the level of coverage 
purchased, identifying information about the purchaser, the premium 
paid, and the amount of any advance payments of tax credits and cost-
sharing subsidies. 
 
145. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152,  
§ 1004, 124 Stat. 1029, 1035 (2010); Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401, 124 Stat. 119, 219 (2010) (adding § 
36B(f) to the IRC). Congress has amended this subsection through 
subsequent legislation. See Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and 
Repayment of Exchange Subsidy Overpayments Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 
112-9, § 4, 125 Stat. 36, 36-37 (2011). I.R.C § 36B(f), as added to the 
PPACA by HCERA: 
(3) INFORMATION REQUIREMENT. Each Exchange (or any person 
carrying out 1 or more responsibilities of an Exchange under 
section 1311(f)(3) or 1321(c) of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act) shall provide the following information to the 
Secretary and to the taxpayer with respect to any health plan 
provided through the Exchange: 
(A) The level of coverage described in section 1302(d) of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the period 
such coverage was in effect. 
(B) The total premium for the coverage without regard to the 
credit under this section or cost-sharing reductions under 
section 1402 of such Act. 
(C) The aggregate amount of any advance payment of such 
credit or reductions under section 1412 of such Act. 
(D) The name, address, and TIN of the primary insured and 
the name and TIN of each other individual obtaining coverage 
under the policy. 
(E) Any information provided to the Exchange, including any 
change of circumstances, necessary to determine eligibility for, 
and the amount of, such credit. 
(F) Information necessary to determine whether a taxpayer 
has received excess advance payments. 
(g)  REGULATIONS. The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as 
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section, including 
regulations which provide for— 
(1) the coordination of the credit allowed under this section with 
the program for advance payment of the credit under section 1412 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and 
(2) the application of subsection (f) where the filing status of the 
taxpayer for a taxable year is different from such status used for 
determining the advance payment of the credit. 
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Supporters of the IRS rule maintain these reporting requirements 
show that Congress sought to make federal and state-run Exchanges 
equivalent with respect to tax credits.146 The Treasury Department 
writes, “The placement of this provision in section 36B and the 
information required to be reported . . . strongly suggests [sic] that all 
taxpayers who enroll in qualified health plans, either through the 
federally-facilitated exchange or a state exchange, should qualify for the 
premium tax credit.”147 Professor Jost writes, “In this later-adopted 
legislation amending the earlier-adopted ACA, Congress demonstrated 
its understanding that federal exchanges would administer premium tax 
credits.”148 Alternatively, supporters of the IRS’ position maintain this 
reporting requirement introduces sufficient ambiguity to permit the IRS 
to resolve the claimed ambiguity by offering tax credits in federal 
Exchanges.149  
To the contrary, these reporting requirements do not suggest, let 
alone require, that state-created and federal Exchanges are functionally 
equivalent with respect to tax credits. These requirements support, 
rather than undermine, the plain meaning of Section 1401. They likewise 
advance the Act’s goal of encouraging states to create Exchanges. 
Nothing about these requirements suggests that Congress erred in 
limiting tax credits and subsidies to the purchase of health insurance in 
state-run exchanges. 
This reporting requirement expressly refers to both state-run 
Exchanges (Section 1311) and federal Exchanges (Section 1321). This 
shows that Congress knew to mention both Sections where that was 
their intent—something Congress did not do when authorizing tax 
credits.150 To the extent this paragraph creates equivalence between 
state-run and federal Exchanges, that equivalence extends only so far as 
the paragraph’s information-reporting requirement.151 
 
146. See Jost, supra note 85. 
147. Letter from Mark J. Mazur, Assistant Sec’y for Tax Policy, U.S. Treasury 
Dep’t, to Rep. Darrell Issa, Chairman, Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 12, 2012). 
148. Timothy S. Jost, Yes, the Federal Exchange Can Offer Premium Tax 
Credits, Health Reform Watch (Sept. 11, 2011), http://www.health 
reformwatch.com/2011/09/11/yes-the-federal-exchange-can-offer-premium-
tax-credits/. 
149. The claim that the IRS’ interpretation of the Act on this question should 
receive Chevron deference is discussed infra Part V.C. 
150. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“Where Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress 
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”); 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2583 (2012). 
151. Some defenders of the IRS rule argue Section 1321 contains equivalence 
language because, after reference to exchanges created under Section 1311, 
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The reporting requirement is clear and straightforward. The 
paragraph refers to “the credit under this section” a total of four times. 
Since this paragraph resides in Section 36B, which authorizes tax credits 
solely in Exchanges “established by the state under section 1311,” it 
plainly requires federal Exchanges to report zero advance payments.  
There are valid reasons why Congress would require federal  
Exchanges to report that and other information about their enrollees. 
First, imposing these reporting requirements on both types of Exchanges 
serves to ensure a degree of uniformity in the information provided to 
the federal government. That not every requirement would seem equally 
applicable to both state and federal Exchanges is not anomalous. It is 
easier for Congress to draft and enact a single set of reporting 
requirements than to enact two separate provisions.  
Second, applying these reporting requirements to federal Exchanges 
enables those Exchanges and the Treasury Secretary to notify individual 
taxpayers of the tax credits for which they would become eligible and to 
publicize to state officials the number of taxpayers who would benefit if 
the state were to establish its own Exchange. The reporting requirement 
thus advances the PPACA’s goal of encouraging states to establish 
Exchanges. Finally, it was necessary for Congress to state explicitly that 
these requirements would apply to both state-created and federal 
Exchanges. Since Section 1401 precludes tax credits in federal 
Exchanges, administrators of federal Exchanges might otherwise think 
that Congress did not want them to compile and report that 
information. 
The text of the reporting requirements even allows that tax credits 
would not be available through federal Exchanges. The paragraph 
provides that state and federal Exchanges must provide information 
about “any” tax credits an individual receives. “Any,” as used here, is 
conditional. That an Exchange is obligated to report “any” advance 
payments made means that if such payments are made they must be 
reported. It does not suggest, let alone require, that such payments will 
be made in all entities covered by the provision any more than this 
language suggests that all individuals who purchase insurance within 
Exchanges must be eligible for premium assistance.  
The fact that the HCERA’s authors made no changes to Section 
1401’s language restricting tax credits to state-run Exchanges 
corroborates that the plain meaning of Section 1401 accurately reflects 
congressional intent that state-created and federal Exchanges would not 
be equivalent in this respect and demonstrates that the reporting 
requirements are not evidence of any contrary intent. The HCERA’s 
authors scoured Section 1401, amending it seven times (and Section 1402 
five times) but left the language restricting tax credits to state-run 
 
it directs the federal government to create “such exchanges” where states 
do not. This claim is addressed infra Part V.D. 
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Exchanges undisturbed.152 It would be difficult to argue that the 
HCERA’s authors noticed that state and territorial Exchanges were not 
equivalent in this respect, but somehow failed to notice the same 
asymmetry between state and federal Exchanges.  
The plain meaning of these reporting requirements is thus consistent 
with the rest of Section 1401 and the overarching goals of the law, as is 
the directive that the Secretary “shall prescribe such regulations as may 
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.” The PPACA 
draws absolutely no equivalence between state-run and federal 
Exchanges when it comes to offering tax credits. Indeed, the only time it 
mentions state and federal Exchanges together is when it enables the 
Secretary to inform people of that fact. 
Another chapter of the PPACA’s legislative history provides further 
evidence that members of Congress did not consider state and federal 
Exchanges under that law to be equivalent. As congressional leaders and 
Obama administration officials attempted to merge the House- and 
Senate-passed bills in late 2009 and early 2010, eleven US 
representatives—all Texas Democrats—authored a letter to President 
Obama, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), and House Majority 
Leader Steny Hoyer (D-MD) expressing their strong opposition to the 
Senate bill’s approach to Exchanges.153 
The letter did not explicitly address whether the bill restricted tax 
credits to states that established Exchanges. Yet the authors clearly saw 
a difference between state-created and federal Exchanges under the 
Senate bill. If states failed to create Exchanges, they warned, residents of 
those states would not “receive[] any benefit” and “millions of people will 
be left no better off than before Congress acted.”154 
The authors of that letter believed that under the PPACA, 
recalcitrant states could block the law’s benefits.155 It seems implausible 
that these members would say taxpayers in states with federal 
Exchanges would see zero benefit if they believed that state and federal 
Exchanges were equivalent and billions of dollars of tax credits and 
subsidies would flow into those states whether or not states cooperated. 
 
152. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152,  
§ 1401, 124 Stat. 1029, 1030-32, 1034-35 (2010). 
153. U.S. Rep. Doggett: Settling for Second-Rate Health Care Doesn’t Serve 
Texans, My Harlingen News (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.myharlingen 
news.com/?p=6426. 
154. Id. (emphasis added). 
155. A contemporaneous report on the letter framed the issue the same way: 
“[The Texas Democrats] worry that because leaders in their state oppose 
the health bill, they won’t bother to create an exchange, leaving uninsured 
state residents with no way to benefit from the new law.” Julie Rovner, 
House, Senate View Health Exchanges Differently, NPR (Jan. 12, 2010, 
4:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 
122476051 (emphasis added). 
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013 
Taxation Without Representation 
164 
Nonetheless, all eleven cosigners subsequently voted for the PPACA 
without any modifications to the language restricting tax credits to 
state-created Exchanges.156 
G. Revealed Intent 
Even if—contrary to the clear language of the statute and its 
legislative history—supporters of the PPACA somehow shared a tacit 
understanding that tax credits would be available in federal Exchanges, 
their actions reveal that their intent was to enact a law without tax 
credits in federal Exchanges. Following Scott Brown’s election, 
congressional Democrats faced two options. The first was to merge the 
House- and Senate-passed bills in a manner that made enough changes 
to secure the support of one Senate Republican, thus enabling 
proponents to invoke cloture on a conference report. This option was 
problematic. Not only was there no guarantee that Democrats could peel 
away one senator from the GOP bloc, but doing so could have moved 
the conference report far enough to the center that House Democrats 
likely would have rejected it. The second option was to have the House 
pass the PPACA, thus sending the bill directly to the president’s desk, 
and have the House and Senate make limited amendments to the 
PPACA through the reconciliation process. Congressional Democrats 
chose the latter strategy. This was in no small part because while a 
“regular order” strategy would have moved the PPACA to the center to 
appease one or another GOP senator, the “reconciliation” strategy would 
move it to the left to appease House Democrats.  
The PPACA’s supporters thus made a quite deliberate choice to 
pass a bill with which none of them were completely satisfied and to use 
the reconciliation process to make only limited amendments because a 
more satisfactory conference report would have failed. They made a 
decision that, whatever the PPACA’s remaining shortcomings, passing it 
with limited amendments was the best they could do under the 
circumstances.157 An “imperfect” bill was better than no bill. It may well 
 
156. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 165, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES (Mar. 21, 2010), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/ 
roll165.xml. 
157. In a letter to Nancy Pelosi encouraging the House to adopt the Senate bill, 
Henry J. Aaron and colleagues wrote: 
Both houses of Congress have adopted legislation that would 
provide health coverage to tens of millions of Americans, begin to 
control health care costs that seriously threaten our economy, and 
improve the quality of health care for every American. These bills 
are imperfect. Yet they represent a huge step forward in creating a 
more humane, effective, and sustainable health care system for 
every American. We have come further than we have ever come 
before. Only two steps remain. The House must adopt the Senate 
bill, and the President must sign it . . . . Some differences between 
the bills, such as the scope of the tax on high-cost plans and the 
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be the case that, as Professor Jost writes, “the Senate Bill was not 
supposed to be the final law.”158 Yet it became their only option. If what 
they passed was a bill without tax credits in federal Exchanges, then 
that is exactly what they intended. If they had sought to pass a bill 
authorizing tax credits in federal Exchanges, there would have been no 
law. If tax credits in federal Exchanges could not have passed Congress, 
it cannot be the law. 
H. An Error of Miscalculation 
The statute and the lack of any support for the IRS rule in the 
legislative record put defenders of the IRS rule in the awkward position 
of arguing that it was so obviously Congress’ intent to offer tax credits 
in federal Exchanges that despite a year of debate over the PPACA, it 
never occurred to anyone to express that intent out loud. A better 
explanation is that the PPACA’s authors miscalculated when they 
assumed states would establish Exchanges. As The New York Times 
reported, “When Congress passed legislation to expand coverage two 
years ago, Mr. Obama and lawmakers assumed that every state would 
set up its own exchange,” and that “running them [would] be a 
herculean task that federal officials never expected to perform.”159 Prior 
to enactment, HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius proclaimed states were 
“very eager” to create Exchanges and predicted most would quickly do 
so.160 The end result would “very much be a State-based program.”161 
 
allocation of premium subsidies, should be repaired through the 
reconciliation process . . . . The Senate bill accomplishes most of 
what both houses of Congress set out to do; it would largely realize 
the goals many Americans across the political spectrum espouse in 
achieving near universal coverage and real delivery reform. 
 Letter from Henry J. Aaron, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution, et 
al. to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, et al. (Jan. 22, 2010), available 
at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2010/01/22/health/adopt_senate 
_bill_final.2.pdf. 
158. Timothy Jost, Tax Credits in Federally Facilitated Exchanges Are 
Consistent with the Affordable Care Act’s Language and History, Health 
Affairs Blog (July 18, 2012), http://www.healthaffairs.org/ 
blog/2012/07/18/tax-credits-in-federally-facilitated-exchanges-are-
consistent-with-the-affordable-care-acts-language-and-history. 
159. Robert Pear, U.S. Officials Brace for Huge Task of Operating Health 
Exchanges, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2012, at A17; see also Elise Viebeck, 
Obama Faces Huge Challenge in Setting Up Health Insurance Exchanges, 
The Hill (Nov. 25, 2012, 2:45 PM), http://www.thehill.com/blogs/ 
healthwatch/health-reform -implementation/269137-obama-faces-huge-
challenge-in-setting-up-health-exchanges (“It’s a situation no one 
anticipated when the Affordable Care Act was written. The law assumed 
states would create and operate their own exchanges . . . .”). 
160. Statement of K. Sebelius, supra note 5. 
161. Id. 
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Shortly after signing the law, President Obama predicted, “by 2014, each 
state will set up what we’re calling a health insurance exchange.”162 If 
the PPACA’s failure to authorize tax credits in federal Exchanges 
represents an error at all, it is that miscalculation. 
Such a miscalculation would be consistent with the widespread view 
among supporters that the public would grow to support the law over 
time163 or the view that the challenge brought against the law by state 
attorneys general was so meritless that federal courts should sanction the 
challengers.164 Having created an enormous incentive for states to 
establish Exchanges, it likely never occurred to some of the Act’s 
authors that states would refuse.165 This interpretation also explains why 
 
162. Remarks on Health Insurance Reform in Portland, Maine, 2010 Daily 
Comp. Pres. Doc. 220 (Apr. 1, 2010). 
163. See, e.g., Naftali Bendavid, Reid: Voters Like Health Law If They 
Understand It, Wall St. J. (Aug. 4, 2010, 4:09 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/08/04/reid-voters-like-health-law-if-
they-understand-it (quoting Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D): “It’s 
very obvious that people have a lack of understanding of our health care 
reform bill . . . [t]he more people learn about this bill, the more they like it 
. . . [t]he trend is turning all over America today . . . [o]nce you explain 
what’s in the bill, the American people of course like it.”); see also Susie 
Madrak, Gov. Ed Rendell: The More People Learn About the Health Care 
Bill, the More They Like it, Crooks & Liars (Mar. 28, 2010), 
http://crooksandliars.com/susie-madrak/gov-ed-rendell-more-people-learn-
abou (quoting former Pennsylvania Gov. Ed Rendell (D): “As more and 
more people get to understand what’s in this bill, people are going to like 
it.”).  
164. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Sanction the 18 State AGs, Nat’l L.J. (Apr. 
12, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/legaltimes/PubArticleFriendlyLT 
.jsp?id=1202447759851&slreturn=1 (“As we all know, Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires an attorney filing a pleading in 
federal court to certify that ‘the claims, defenses, and other legal 
contentions are warranted by existing law’ and ‘the factual contentions 
have evidentiary support.’ The court can sanction an attorney who violates 
this rule, including an obligation to pay the costs and reasonable attorney 
fees of the opposing party . . . . This complaint not only represents 
shockingly shoddy lawyering but should be recognized by the courts for 
what it in fact is: A pleading whose key claims are without support in the 
law and the facts. The attorneys who brought this case—solely for political 
purposes—should have to bear personally the cost of defending this 
litigation that they are imposing on federal taxpayers.”). 
165. Tom Howell Jr., After Obamacare Health Exchange Deadline Passes, 26 
States Opt In with Feds, Washington Times (Feb. 16, 2013), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/16/after-obamacare-
health-exchange-deadline-passes-26/?page=all (“The Obama administra-
tion says it will be ready to run exchanges in more than half of the states  
. . . . ‘It’s not what the drafters of the bill had hoped would 
happen,’ Timothy S. Jost, a professor at Washington and Lee University 
School of Law who specializes in health care, said of the outcome on 
Friday.”).  
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the PPACA authorizes no funding for HHS to create federal 
Exchanges.166 Its authors did not anticipate that such funds would be 
necessary.167 
V. Assessing Other Potential Legal Rationales for 
the IRS Rule 
As demonstrated above, the text, purpose, structure, and history of 
the PPACA do not support the IRS rule. That does not end the 
arguments in favor of the rule, however. Insofar as the language of the 
PPACA would seem to bar the IRS rule, commentators have suggested 
several additional rationales in defense of the administrative extension of 
tax credits and subsidies to federal exchanges. First, some suggest that 
the language of Section 1401 was a “scrivener’s error” that the IRS and 
any reviewing court would be justified in disregarding. Second, some 
suggest the plain text of Section 1401 should be disregarded because it 
would produce “absurd results” that undermine the purpose and intent 
of the PPACA. Third, some argue that, insofar as the text of Section 
36B is ambiguous or unclear, particularly when read in light of 
subsequent amendments, the IRS should receive deference for its 
interpretation under the Chevron doctrine. Fourth, some argue that 
statutes should be read in light of evaluations by Congressional agencies 
such as the Congressional Budget Office, and that such an approach 
would support the IRS rule. Each of these arguments has a superficial 
plausibility. None withstands scrutiny.  
A. Scrivener’s Error 
One possible argument in defense of the IRS rule is that the text of 
the PPACA contains a simple mistake that the IRS can and should 
disregard. Specifically, the claim is that Section 1401’s failure to mention 
federal Exchanges created pursuant to the authority in Section 1321 was 
an error made in the drafting or transcribing of the legislation and does 
not reflect legislative intent. Professor Timothy Jost, for instance, has 
argued that the textual limitation of tax credits and subsidies to state-
run (i.e., Section 1311) Exchanges is a “drafting error” that “is obvious 
 
166. J. Lester Feder, HHS May Have to Get ‘Creative’ on Exchange, Politico 
(Aug. 16, 2011, 6:54 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0811/ 
61513.html#ixzz1zaMlZBtO. 
167. To paraphrase another famous miscalculation, the PPACA’s authors 
believed that when they reached state capitols, they would be greeted as 
liberators. See Anti-war Ad Says Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld & Rice “Lied” 
About Iraq, Factcheck (Sept. 25, 2005), http://www.factcheck.org/ 
iraq/print_anti-war_ad_says_bush_cheney_rumsfeld.html (quoting Vice 
President Dick Cheney on the eve of the US-led invasion of Iraq: “We will 
be greeted as liberators.”). 
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to anyone who understands” the PPACA.168 If the “error” is, in fact, 
“obvious,” then it may be the sort of error that a federal agency (and 
reviewing courts) should disregard as a “scrivener’s error.”169 
A “scrivener’s error” is supposed to be just that—a purely clerical 
error that could be attributed to a failed transcription or something of 
that sort.170 Common examples are errors in punctuation that, when read 
literally, alter the meaning of a statutory provision and mistaken cross-
references to subsections in a statute—say, mistaking “(i)” for “(ii)” or 
“Section 36B(B)(I)(b)” for “Section 36(B)(I)(b).” These are the sorts of 
mistakes a legislator could easily miss when reviewing 2,000 pages of 
statutory text or that could even be introduced into a statute when it is 
amended or transcribed—hence the name “scrivener’s error.”  
To establish that a statutory provision is a scrivener’s error typically 
requires showing that it is implausible, not merely unlikely, that a 
statutory provision was drafted as its authors intended. As the Supreme 
Court explained in U.S. National Bank of Oregon v. Independent 
Insurance Agents of America, this will only be shown in the “unusual” 
case in which there is “overwhelming evidence from the structure, 
language, and subject matter of the law” that Congress could not have 
 
168. Jost, supra note 85; see Robert Pear, Brawling Over Health Care Moves to 
Rules on Exchanges, N.Y. Times, July 8, 2012, at A14 (“Some supporters 
of the law say Congress may have made a mistake in drafting this 
section.”). Professor Jost has since abandoned this argument. See Timothy 
Jost, Tax Credits in Federally Facilitated Exchanges Are Consistent with 
the Affordable Care Act’s Language and History, Health Affairs Blog 
(July 18, 2012), http://www.healthaffairs.org/ 
blog/2012/07/18/tax-credits-in-federally-facilitated-exchanges-are-
consistent-with-the-affordable-care-acts-language-and-history (“I agree with 
Cannon and Adler that the courts are unlikely to find the ‘established by 
the state’ language a ‘scrivener’s error.’”). 
169. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 234 (2012) (“No one would contend 
that the mistake cannot be corrected if it is of the sort sometimes described 
as a ‘scrivener’s error.’” (citing Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation 
and Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo. L.J. 281, 289 (1989) (“If the directive 
contains a typographical error, correcting the error can hardly be 
considered disobedience.”))). 
170. See, e.g., U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 
439, 462 (1993) (stating that a “scrivener’s error”—in this case, mistaken 
punctuation that changed the statute’s meaning—was characterized as “a 
mistake made by someone unfamiliar with the law’s object and design”). 
According to Justice Antonin Scalia, a scrivener’s error may be found 
“where on the very face of the statute it is clear to the reader that a 
mistake of expression (rather than of legislative wisdom) has been made.” 
Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts 
and the Law 20 (1997); see also Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, 
Scrivener’s Errors and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 25, 56 
n.167 (2006). 
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consciously adopted the language in the statute.171 Similarly, in 
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit explained that: 
We will not . . . invoke this rule to ratify an interpretation that 
abrogates the enacted statutory text absent an extraordinarily 
convincing justification [because] . . . the court’s role is not to 
‘correct’ the text so that it better serves the statute’s purposes, for 
it is the function of the political branches not only to define the 
goals but also to choose the means for reaching  
them . . . . Therefore, for the [agency] to avoid a literal 
interpretation . . . it must show either that, as a matter of 
historical fact, Congress did not mean what it appears to have 
said, or that, as a matter of logic and statutory structure, it 
almost surely could not have meant it.172 
Further, the showing must be exceedingly strong for a reviewing court to 
disregard the statute’s text because the legislature is always free to 
correct its own mistakes. As Justice Kennedy noted for a unanimous 
court in Lamie v. United States Trustee, “If Congress enacted into law 
something different from what it intended, then it should amend the 
statute to conform it to its intent.”173 Where a “scrivener’s error” is 
found, an implementing agency or reviewing court is justified in 
disregarding the literal text of the statute insofar as this is necessary to 
correct the mistake, but no further. The discovery of a scrivener’s error 
is not a justification for writing a statute anew.174 
Given the PPACA’s unusual (and somewhat hurried) legislative 
history, one could anticipate that there are scrivener’s errors of one sort 
or another in the Act. As Justice Stevens observed, “a busy Congress is 
fully capable of enacting a scrivener’s error into law,”175 and the  
171. 508 U.S. at 462. 
172. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(internal quotation omitted); see also United States v. X-Citement Video, 
513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the “sine qua non” of 
the doctrine “is that the meaning genuinely intended but inadequately 
expressed must be absolutely clear; otherwise we might be rewriting the 
statute rather than correcting a technical mistake.”). 
173. Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004); see also United 
States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 68 (1994) (“It is beyond our province to 
rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might 
think . . . is the preferred result.”). 
174. Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at 1043-44 (“Lest it ‘obtain a license to 
rewrite the statute,’ . . . we do not give an agency alleging a scrivener’s 
error the benefit of Chevron step two deference, by which the court credits 
any reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute. Rather, the agency 
‘may deviate no further from the statute than is needed to protect 
congressional intent.’” (citations omitted)).  
175. Koons Buick, Pontiac, GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65 (2004) (Stevens, 
J., concurring). 
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Congress that passed the PPACA was extraordinarily busy. Sure 
enough, some such errors can be found in the Act. For example, there is 
a textbook scrivener’s error in the very clause where PPACA restricts 
tax credits to state-run Exchanges. Section 1401 amended the Internal 
Revenue Code to make taxpayers eligible for premium-assistance tax 
credits if they enroll in a qualified health plan “through an Exchange 
established by the State under 1311 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act.”176 Obviously, the authors inadvertently omitted 
the word “Section” before “1311.” The Act contains dozens of references 
to “Section 1311,” including a reference elsewhere in Section 1401 that 
uses identical language but includes the word “Section.”177 The omission 
of “Section” is a clear scrivener’s error. It is an error of transcription, 
and the language is open to no other interpretation.  
Another textbook scrivener’s error exists in the section of the 
PPACA that creates the Independent Payment Advisory Board.178 
Subsection (f)(1) details the requirements for a type of joint resolution 
mentioned in “subsection (e)(3)(B).”179 Yet subsection (e)(3)(B) makes 
no mention of joint resolutions. The authors clearly meant to refer to 
subsection (e)(3)(A). It is there that the Act first mentions the joint 
resolution in question. Subsection (e)(3)(A) even contains a cross-
reference: it states that the joint resolution is “described in subsection 
(f)(1).”180 The use of “(B)” instead of “(A)” is a clear scrivener’s error.  
In contrast to these provisions, the failure to authorize tax credits 
for insurance purchased through federal Exchanges is not a “scrivener’s 
error.” As noted above, there is a plausible rationale for the way the 
statute is written and ample evidence that the language of the statute 
provides for what at least some of its authors intended. Either alone 
would be sufficient to defeat a scrivener’s error claim. The alleged error 
here is also more significant than the sort typically recognized as a 
scrivener’s error. Section 1401 specifically mentions the type of 
Exchanges through which tax credits will be available (those 
“established by the State”) and the relevant Section (1311). It makes no 
mention of federally run Exchanges or Section 1321. A legislator 
reviewing the relevant language could not claim that they did not realize 
the statutory cross-reference excluded federal Exchanges because the 
clear text of the statute does as well.  
There is also no evidence we have been able to identify to suggest 
that the failure to mention Section 1321 in Section 1401’s eligibility rules 
 
176. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 11-148,  
§ 1401(a), 124 Stat. 119, 213 (2010). 
177. § 1401(a).  
178. § 3403(f)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(a) (2010). 
179. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(f)(1) (2010). 
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(e)(3)(A)(ii) (2010). 
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for premium-assistance tax credits could have been an error of 
transcription or something of that sort. We have been unable to identify 
text in any previous iteration of the law—something equivalent to the 
IRS rule’s “or 1321”—which a legislative staffer or someone else might 
have mistranscribed or inadvertently dropped in order to produce the 
result the IRS rule seeks. In every material respect, the final versions of 
the PPACA’s relevant provisions are identical to previous drafts of the 
Finance Committee bill. Those eligibility rules make numerous references 
to Exchanges. If the unavailability of tax credits through Section 1321 
Exchanges had been a scrivener’s error, one might expect at least one of 
those references to leave the door open to the possibility of tax credits 
through federal Exchanges. Yet as noted above, those eligibility rules 
consistently and exclusively refer to Section 1311 Exchanges. However 
many such errors there may be in the Act, the failure to authorize tax 
credits for the purchase of health insurance in federally run Exchanges is 
not among them. 
Further, in order to establish the existence of a scrivener’s error that 
could be corrected by agency regulation, the IRS would have to do more 
than show that Congress “clearly did not mean”181 to create a 
presumably undesirable scenario in which the PPACA’s “community 
rating” price controls and individual mandate would take effect but the 
tax credits would not. The IRS would have to meet the more difficult 
test of showing that Congress could not have intended to produce such a 
result. Supporters of the rule would have to show, as Professor Jost 
claims, “[t]here is no coherent policy reason why Congress would have 
refused premium tax credits to the citizens of states that ended up with 
a federal exchange.”182  
The IRS cannot meet this test. The record clearly shows that 
PPACA supporters had a coherent policy reason for withholding tax 
credits from uncooperative states. They considered it a viable means of 
encouraging states to implement the law.183 Not only is it plausible that 
Congress wanted to restrict tax credits to state-run Exchanges, that 
restriction is an essential part of the Act because it is the primary means 
of enforcing the directive that states “shall” create Exchanges. The 
HCERA’s explicit authorization of tax credits and subsidies through 
territorial Exchanges, the HELP bill’s explicit authorization of credits 
through federal Gateways, and the rest of the legislative history further 
show that the PPACA’s authors made a deliberate policy choice. The 
record further shows that PPACA supporters contemplated and even 
created scenarios like what would exist in federal Exchanges, where 
community-rating price controls would operate without tax credits or 
 
181. See Jost, supra note 85. 
182. Id.  
183. The use of tax credits for this purpose was also suggested by academics 
supportive of the PPACA. See Jost, supra note 129. 
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subsidies to mitigate the resulting instability.184 Such a policy may not 
be wise or fair. It may even undermine the goal of expanding health 
insurance coverage to the uninsured. But it is a sufficiently plausible 
account of congressional intent to defeat a claim of a scrivener’s error.185  
The feature of the statute that the IRS rule seeks to “correct” fails 
both parts of the scrivener’s-error test. Failing to include an entire clause 
or paragraph that would have authorized two new entitlements is not an 
error of transcription. It is not equivalent to omitting the word “section” 
when referring to Section 1311 nor to mistyping “(B)” where only “(A)” 
makes sense. There is a perfectly reasonable explanation for why the 
PPACA would mean what it says: the PPACA’s authors sought to offer 
tax credits and subsidies as an incentive to encourage states to create 
Exchanges. For purposes of the scrivener’s-error test, it is sufficient to 
show that this interpretation is plausible. The PPACA’s legislative 
history, as recounted above, shows this explanation is not only plausible 
but actually the best explanation available.  
B. Absurd Results 
A related argument for discarding the plain meaning of the statutory 
text is that a literal application of the text will produce such an absurd 
result that Congress could not have intended it.186 As the Supreme Court 
explained in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, if “‘the literal 
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with 
the intentions of its drafters’ . . . , the intention of the drafters, rather 
than the strict language, controls.”187 In such cases, an implementing 
agency or reviewing court would be justified in construing a statute in 
such a way as would prevent the absurd result. Again, however, this 
argument requires more than demonstrating that a literal application of 
 
184. See infra Part V.B. 
185. See, e.g., Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 526 (2003) (noting 
potential reasons Congress may have desired the result the alleged error 
created). 
186. See, e.g., United States v. X–Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68–69 
(1994) (rejecting the “most natural grammatical reading” of a statute to 
avoid “absurd” results). The most famous, or perhaps infamous, 
application of this rule is Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 
457, 459–60 (1892) (“It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the 
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its 
spirit nor within the intention of its makers . . . . If a literal construction of 
the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid 
the absurdity.”). Since Holy Trinity, courts have become decidedly less 
willing to find that the plain language of a statute produces “absurd 
results” justifying an agency departure from the statutory text. See 
generally John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 
2387, 2388 (2002-03); see also Gold, supra note 170, at 59. 
187. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting 
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
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the statutory text would be undesirable or objectionable to some portion 
of those who supported or advocated the law’s passage. It requires that 
the result would be truly “absurd” or unimaginable.188  
To avail itself of the “absurd results” doctrine, the IRS could argue 
that denying tax credits to otherwise qualifying individuals who reside in 
states that fail to create their own Exchanges would produce such 
absurd consequences that it is inconceivable that the Act would mean 
what it says. The only potential absurd results argument is that denying 
tax credits in federal exchanges would compromise the PPACA’s stated 
goal of increasing access to affordable health insurance, particularly if a 
large number of states were to refuse to create their own Exchanges.  
One consequence of the PPACA imposing the community-rating 
requirement on health insurance sold in federal Exchanges without the 
presumably stabilizing influence of tax credits would be to destabilize 
insurance markets, as health insurance premiums would rise, causing 
many healthy purchasers to exit the market. Yet the mere existence of 
unwanted effects from a statutory reform is insufficient to show that a 
statute will produce truly “absurd” results, let alone demonstrate that 
the language is different than that intended by Congress. In this case, 
the allegedly “absurd” result is a consequence of how states respond to 
the PPACA and not of the text itself. 
No legislation pursues a single goal without regard for costs or 
competing priorities.189 However much legislators seek to pursue a 
particular goal, they may still conclude a statute “should reach so far 
and no farther.”190 Trade-offs are omnipresent, and there is rarely a 
statute that does not contain some provision that tampers with or 
moderates the statute’s overall goal. Further, and perhaps more 
importantly, a law reflects a deal or compromise made among multiple 
legislative blocs and rarely embodies all of one bloc’s preferences.191 This 
is particularly true when, as here, legislation passes without a vote to 
spare. Thus there is no reason to privilege one group’s preferences or 
 
188. See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984) (noting “[o]nly 
the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions” can justify ignoring 
statutory text); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 96 
(1820) (“The case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a court 
in departing from the plain meaning of words . . . in search of an intention 
which the words themselves did not suggest.”). 
189. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 
541 (1983) (“No matter how good the end in view, achievement of the end 
will have some cost, and at some point the cost will begin to exceed the 
benefits.”). 
190. Id. 
191. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary 
in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875, 876 (1975); 
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell. J. Econ. 
& Mgmt. Sci. 3, 3 (1971). 
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stated intent over the plain meaning of the statute that it approved. 
And, as already suggested, there is an entirely plausible explanation for 
the statutory structure that Congress adopted: conditioning the 
availability of tax credits on state creation of an Exchange was a method 
of encouraging state cooperation.192  
Even though restricting tax credits to state-run Exchanges could 
frustrate the law’s goal of expanding health insurance coverage, this 
would not be a sufficiently “absurd” result to justify disregarding the 
plain text of the Act. The plain meaning of Section 1401 is not absurd 
for the same reason it is not implausible that Congress could have meant 
what it said: the lack of tax credits in federal Exchanges is just one 
manifestation of PPACA supporters’ willingness to induce adverse 
selection in insurance markets in pursuit of other goals. Indeed, the 
Exchange provisions are but one example of Congress doing exactly that 
through the PPACA.  
In at least two other instances, Congress displayed an even higher 
tolerance for iatrogenic instability than what it created in federal 
Exchanges. One example is the Act’s imposition of community-rating 
price controls on health insurance for children. The Act imposed these 
price controls with neither a mandate nor subsidies to encourage low-risk 
individuals to remain in the market. This provision took effect on 
September 23, 2010—six months after the PPACA’s enactment and 
more than three years before families with children would become 
subject to the individual mandate or be eligible for tax credits or 
subsidies. As a result, thirty-nine states reported that at least one carrier 
left the child-only market, and in seventeen of those states, the market 
completely collapsed. In some cases, the PPACA caused the market to 
collapse before the price controls even took effect.193 
A second example is the Community Living Assistance Services and 
Supports (CLASS) Act, a government-run long-term care insurance 
program authorized by the PPACA. By law, premiums in that program 
could not vary according to an applicant’s risk. Congress neither 
imposed a mandate requiring low-risk individuals to participate in this 
program nor created tax credits or subsidies to encourage low-risk 
individuals to participate. Prior to enactment, independent observers 
warned that the community-rating price controls would induce adverse 
selection and make the program highly unstable,194 a reality the Obama 
 
192. This structure also served to provide the Senate Finance Committee with 
jurisdiction over the bill. See supra Part IV.E. 
193. U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 
Ranking Member Report: Health Care Reform Law’s Impact on 
Child-Only Health Insurance Policies (2011).  
194. Richard S. Foster, Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 
Estimated Financial Effects of the “America’s Affordable 
Health Choices Act of 2009” (H.R. 3962), as Passed by the House 
on November 7, 2009 11 (2009); see also American Academy of 
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administration ultimately acknowledged in 2011.195 Congress enacted it 
anyway.196 
This feature also appeared in both of the PPACA’s antecedents.197 
For example, the situation the PPACA creates in states that fail to 
create Exchanges is exactly what the HELP bill would have created in 
states that failed to implement that bill’s employer mandate. Many 
members of Congress supported both bills.  
 
Actuaries, Critical Issues in Health Reform: Community Living 
Assistance Service and Supports Act (CLASS) (2009); Richard S. 
Foster, Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Estimated 
Financial Effects of the “Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act,” as Amended 15 (2010); Dep’t of Health and Human 
Services, Office of the CLASS Actuary, Actuarial Report on 
the Development of Class Benefit Plans 35 (2011) (“It is not a 
coincidence that many experts have maintained that adverse selection is 
the major obstacle for the CLASS program. Any workable design must 
address it in order to receive certification as an actuarially sound plan.”). 
195. Sam Baker, HHS Decision Erases Nearly $100B of Projected Savings from 
Reform Law, The Hill (Oct. 14, 2011, 4:44 PM), http://thehill.com/ 
blogs/healthwatch/health-reform-implementation/187727-hhs-decision-
erases-nearly-100b-of-projected-savings-from-reform-law (“The Obama 
administration’s decision Friday to scrap a controversial insurance program 
wiped out nearly $100 billion of the projected savings from the healthcare 
reform law. Officials at the Health and Human Services Department 
announced they will no longer try to implement the CLASS program, 
which was designed to provide insurance for long-term care. By suspending 
the CLASS Act, HHS also erases about 40 percent of the savings the 
healthcare reform was supposed to generate for the government.”). One 
might argue that the CLASS Act is not an apt example of PPACA 
supporters’ tolerance for adverse selection because the law requires it to be 
self-sustaining and HHS suspended implementation due to the 
Department’s inability to develop a sustainable model for the program. But 
if the IRS were to claim Congress would not have enacted community-
rating price controls without also subsidizing low-risk consumers, the 
CLASS Act is an example of Congress doing just that. Moreover, the non-
partisan Congressional Research Service has written that federal courts 
have ordered HHS to implement the CLASS Act even if it is not 
sustainable. See Avik Roy, Congressional Research Service: Courts Could 
Force HHS to Implement CLASS Act, Despite Its Insolvency, Forbes 
(Feb. 1, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/02/01/ 
congressional-research-service-courts-could-force-hhs-to-implement-class-
act-despite-its-insolvency/.  
196. Albeit temporarily, Congress and President Obama repealed the CLASS 
Act in January 2013. See Sarah Kliff, The Fiscal Cliff Cuts $1.9 Billion 
from Obamacare. Here’s How., Wash. Post (Jan. 2, 2013, 10:50 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/02/the-
fiscal-cliff-cuts-1-9-billion-from-obamacare-heres-how/ (“The CLASS Act is 
officially repealed.”). 
197. Affordable Health Choices Act, S. 1697, 111th Cong. §§ 101, 190-91 (2009); 
America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009, S. 1796, 111th Cong.  
§ 1001 (2009). 
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These examples show that the lack of tax credits in federal 
Exchanges is consistent with the high tolerance for adverse selection 
evident elsewhere in the Act and reinforces that this is not the sort of 
“absurd” result that would justify ignoring clear statutory text. Congress 
clearly contemplated allowing community-rating price controls to 
operate in the absence of credits or subsidies that might mitigate the 
resulting instability. The PPACA actually does more to mitigate adverse 
selection in federal Exchanges than in either the child-only market or the 
CLASS Act: Congress imposed an individual mandate that would take 
effect at the same time federal Exchanges would begin operations. Thus, 
there is nothing about the lack of tax credits in federal Exchanges to 
suggest a departure from congressional intent, absurd or otherwise.  
Finally, conditioning the availability of tax credits on states creating 
Exchanges is no more absurd than Congress’ decision to condition 
Medicaid funds on states implementing the program. As written, the 
PPACA threatened to withhold all funding for the Medicaid expansion 
and pre-existing Medicaid programs from noncompliant states. Had any 
state refused to cooperate under these terms, enforcing the statute would 
compromise the PPACA’s goal of expanding coverage. Indeed, it would 
result in the loss of coverage for existing Medicaid beneficiaries. Yet 
there is no question that Congress intended to give states this choice, 
creating a risk that recalcitrant states could undermine achievement of 
the PPACA’s stated goal of expanding coverage. The same is true of the 
entire Medicaid program. 
Even if the consequences of enforcing the plain language of Section 
1401 would strike some as “absurd,” this does not give the IRS “license 
to rewrite the statute.”198 Rather, where an agency concludes that literal 
enforcement of the statutory text would thwart congressional intent, “it 
may deviate no further from the statute than is needed to protect 
congressional intent.”199 This, in turn, calls upon a reviewing court to 
consult other sources of legislative intent so as to ensure that the law in 
question is applied as intended.200 
C. Chevron Deference  
Another argument in support of the IRS rule is that the IRS should 
receive Chevron deference in its interpretation of the relevant 
provisions.201 According to Professor Jost, the IRS’ interpretation should 
 
198. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
199. Id.  
200. See Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) 
(“Where the literal reading of a statutory term would ‘compel an odd 
result,’ we must search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend 
the term its proper scope.” (citing Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 
U.S. 504, 509 (1989)).  
201. See, e.g., John D. Kraemer & Lawrence O. Gostin, The Power to Block the 
Affordable Care Act: What are the Limits?, 308 JAMA 1975, 1975 (2012) 
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prevail because Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.202 requires that an agency’s “official construction of an 
ambiguous statute should be accorded deference by any reviewing 
court.”203 Thus, even if Section 1401 appears to be clear and 
unambiguous when read in isolation, the IRS could argue that the text 
and structure of the law as a whole creates sufficient ambiguity about 
the operation of this provision to trigger Chevron deference.204 So, for 
instance, Professor Jost argues the HCERA “creates an ambiguity in the 
law that the IRS can resolve through its rule-making power.”205 Here 
again, arguments in defense of the IRS rule falter.  
Chevron outlined a two-step inquiry for courts to apply when 
evaluating agency interpretations of federal statutes. First, the reviewing 
court considers the statutory text to determine “whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”206 If so, the statute 
controls, “for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”207 If the reviewing court 
concludes that the statute is “silent or ambiguous,” however, and 
determines that interpretive authority has been delegated to the agency, 
the court must defer to the agency’s statutory interpretation, so long as 
it “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”208 At this 
second step, the agency’s interpretation is given “controlling weight” 
unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.”209 
Although there has been some suggestion that Chevron is not 
applicable to IRS or even Treasury Department regulations, the 
Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that this approach applies “with 
 
(suggesting courts would defer to regulation authorizing tax credits in 
federal exchanges). 
202. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
203. Jost, supra note 85.  
204. The Supreme Court has endorsed the idea that statutory provisions should 
be read in light of the entire statutory structure. See, e.g.,  
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (“A 
court must . . . interpret the statute ‘as a symmetrical and coherent 
regulatory scheme . . . .’” (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 
569 (1995))).  
205. David Hogberg, Companies Could Challenge ObamaCare Employer Fines, 
Investor’s Bus. Daily (Sept. 16, 2011, 5:46 PM), http://news.investors 
.com/article/585053/201109161746/companies-could-challenge-obamacare-
employer-fines.htm. 
206. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842 (1984). 
207. Id. at 842-43. 
208. Id. at 843. 
209. Id. at 844. 
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full force in the tax context.”210 “Filling gaps in the Internal Revenue 
Code plainly requires the Treasury Department to make interpretive 
choices for statutory implementation,”211 but the Treasury Department 
(and the IRS) are entitled to no extra leeway or special treatment. 
Further, while Chevron is quite permissive to agency interpretations, 
such deference only applies once a court has concluded a statute is 
ambiguous. The reviewing court owes the agency “no deference” on the 
question of whether a statute is ambiguous in the first place.212 
But ambiguity alone does not trigger Chevron deference.213 As the 
Supreme Court has made clear in recent years, most notably in United 
States v. Mead Corp.,214 the basis for according deference to agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes is the conclusion that Congress has 
delegated such interpretive authority to the agency. Chevron applies 
only “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency 
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.”215 Further, notes Professor Adrian Vermeule, “the default 
rule runs against delegation. Unless the reviewing court affirmatively 
finds that Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority to the 
particular agency at hand, in the particular statutory scheme at hand, 
Chevron deference is not due and the Chevron two-step is not to be 
invoked.”216  
The IRS’ primary argument is that its interpretation is “consistent 
with” the statute and that there is no evidence in “the relevant 
 
210. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
704, 713 (2011). 
211. Id. 
212. See Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The first 
question, whether there is such an ambiguity, is for the court, and we owe 
the agency no deference on the existence of ambiguity.”); see also Ry. 
Labor Exec. Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (en banc). 
213. See Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Mere 
ambiguity in a statute is not evidence of congressional delegation of 
authority.”) (citations omitted). 
214. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
215. Id. at 226–27; see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 
(1990); Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 479 
n.14 (1997) (citing Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996) 
(explaining that deference “arises out of background presumptions of 
congressional intent”); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 863 (2000-01) (observing that “[t]he 
Court . . . has rather consistently opted for the congressional intent 
theory” as the legal foundation for Chevron deference). 
216. See Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 347, 348 (2003). 
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legislative history” to “demonstrate that Congress intended to limit the 
premium tax credit to State Exchanges.”217 In effect, the IRS is arguing 
that because the PPACA does not preclude the agency’s interpretation, 
that interpretation should control.  
This rationale for the rule cannot satisfy Chevron step one. To claim 
that an agency action is consistent with a statute is not even an 
assertion, much less a showing of ambiguity. A lack of evidence (in the 
“relevant” legislative history) that Congress intended to forbid an 
agency action is likewise not enough to demonstrate a statutory 
ambiguity, let alone to justify Chevron deference. Agencies have no 
inherent powers, only delegated ones.218 Agencies, including the IRS, “are 
creatures of statute . . . [that] may act only because, and only to the 
extent that, Congress affirmatively has delegated them the power to 
act.”219 When Congress is silent on a question—such as whether an 
agency has authority to issue tax credits, authorize entitlement spending 
in the form of refundable credits or cost-sharing subsidies, or levy taxes 
on employers—one should presume that the authority does not exist.  
The D.C. Circuit has expressly rejected the proposition that Chevron 
step two is satisfied “any time a statute does not expressly negate the 
existence of a claimed administrative power.”220 In American Bar 
Association v. Federal Trade Commission, for example, the court 
forcefully rejected the FTC’s claim that it could interpret a statute to 
provide a source of regulatory authority because “no language in the 
statute” expressly provided otherwise.221 Similarly, in Railway Labor 
Executives’ Association v. National Mediation Board, the D.C. Circuit 
rejected the proposition that an agency could “presume delegation of 
power from Congress absent an express withholding of such power.”222 As 
the Court explained: 
To suggest . . . that Chevron step two is implicated any time a 
statute does not expressly negate the existence of a claimed 
 
217. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,378 (May 
23, 2012).  
218. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is 
axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative 
regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.”); Louisiana 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency 
literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power 
upon it.”). 
219. American Bus Ass’n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Sentelle, J., 
concurring). 
220. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 
(D.C. Cir. 1994); see also ABA v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
221. ABA, 430 F.3d at 468. 
222. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 29 F.3d at 659 (emphasis in original). 
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administrative power (i.e. when the statute is not written in “thou 
shalt not” terms), is . . . flatly unfaithful to the principles of 
administrative law.223  
 Even if the IRS were able to satisfy Chevron step one by convincing 
a court that the relevant portions of the PPACA are sufficiently 
ambiguous to justify an IRS interpretation, the IRS rule would still fail. 
Reaching step two of the Chevron test does not give agencies free rein. 
For an agency’s interpretation to prevail at step two, it must still be 
consistent with the relevant statutory text. Thus, even if the IRS could 
demonstrate that the PPACA is ambiguous, it would have to argue that 
its rule is consistent with what Congress actually enacted and the 
President signed into law. As the foregoing discussion of the statute’s 
text, structure, and history should make clear, this would be difficult. 
The IRS’s interpretation is decidedly inconsistent with the statute’s 
repeated and consistent use of language restricting tax credits to 
Exchanges “established by the state under section 1311.” 
Suppose, however, the IRS was able to convince a reviewing court 
that the PPACA is ambiguous on whether it limits tax credits to state-
based Exchanges. The IRS would also need to demonstrate that this 
ambiguity was evidence of an implicit delegation of authority to 
interpret the statute in a way that would authorize the creation of new 
tax credits, new entitlement spending, and new taxes on employers and 
individuals beyond the purview of the traditional legislative 
appropriations process. This is not the sort of authority one should 
lightly presume Congress delegated to an agency.224 To paraphrase the 
Supreme Court, Congress does not hide such “elephants in 
mouseholes.”225  
 
223. Id. at 671. 
224. The framers of the Constitution considered the power to tax so dangerous 
that they required that “[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the 
House of Representatives” because that chamber is closest to the people. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Yet the IRS would maintain that Congress 
somehow delegated such authority to a federal agency despite the lack of 
express statutory language to that effect. 
225. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); see also 
Recent Regulation: Statutory Interpretation—Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act—Internal Revenue Service Interprets ACA to Provide 
Tax Credits for Individuals Purchasing Insurance on Federally Facilitated 
Exchanges.—Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377 
(May 23, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1), 126 Harv. L. Rev. 663 
(2012) (“While the debate surrounding this rule has largely concentrated 
on whether the text and legislative history support the IRS’s 
interpretation, the political saliency and economic impact of the rule may 
provide an opportunity for a reviewing court to clarify the limits of the 
major questions exception to the doctrine of judicial deference established 
in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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If an ambiguity of that sort were sufficient to trigger full Chevron 
deference to this type of agency action, ambiguities in tax-related 
statutes could become so substantial a fount of IRS power that it would 
raise difficult constitutional questions.226 Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution vests all legislative power in the Congress, and Article I, 
Section 9 provides that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, 
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”227 For an agency 
to claim unilateral authority to interpret a statute so as to draw money 
from the Treasury—in this case, through entitlement spending in the 
form of refundable tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies—is to assert 
authority of questionable constitutional validity. The same applies to the 
taxing power, which the Constitution likewise reserves solely to 
Congress.228 It is a longstanding principle that courts are to avoid those 
statutory interpretations that would raise difficult constitutional 
questions.229 This is true even where a statute is sufficiently ambiguous 
that it might otherwise justify Chevron deference.230 
It would be one thing if Congress were expressly to delegate 
authority to the IRS to provide premium assistance under general 
conditions that the IRS could then clarify and define. Here, however, the 
IRS is claiming the authority to authorize tax credits and entitlement 
spending beyond the express limits imposed by Congress. Yet the IRS’ 
position is not that its interpretation is compelled by the PPACA, only 
that it is “consistent with” it. This means the decision to provide such 
tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies is being made not by Congress, 
where such power has been vested, but by the IRS. The IRS position, at 
heart, is that Congress has enacted an ambiguous statute and thereby 
delegated to the IRS the discretionary authority to decide whether or 
 
226. See Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: 
A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory 
Interpretation, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1239, 1282 (2002) (“If administrators 
were given ‘final authority on issues of statutory construction,’ this shift in 
power would substantially undermine our constitutional commitment to 
representative government.” (citation omitted)). 
227. U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 8-9. 
228. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; see also Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 
U.S. 212, 223 (1989) (noting “Congress must indicate clearly its intention 
to delegate” authority to impose taxes or fees). 
229. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise 
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional 
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems 
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”); 
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1988). 
230. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (“Where an administrative 
interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we 
expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”). 
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not tax credits, subsidies, and taxes are authorized in states that do not 
establish Exchanges. This is authority Congress would not grant lightly 
and is certainly not the sort of authority to be found in an alleged 
statutory ambiguity. Thus even if one were to conclude Section 1401 of 
the PPACA is ambiguous, it would still not justify deference to the IRS. 
Supporters of the rule point to language in the PPACA granting the 
IRS authority to promulgate regulations to implement the law as 
authority for the IRS rule. Professor Jost, for example, argues, “Section 
36B(g) gives the Secretary of the Treasury the responsibility of issuing 
regulations to implement section 36B. This includes the authority to 
reconcile ambiguities in the statute, such as the inconsistency” created 
by the information-reporting requirement.231  
Although subsection 36B(g) of the Internal Revenue Code grants the 
Secretary the power to “prescribe such regulations as may be necessary 
to carry out the provisions of this section,”232 it does not vest the 
Secretary with the power to issue this rule. It is not necessary to impose 
unauthorized taxes, issue unauthorized tax credits, dispense 
unauthorized subsidies to private health insurance companies, or create 
two unauthorized entitlements for individuals in order to implement the 
one entitlement Section 1401 does authorize, or to carry out its reporting 
requirement. Nor is it necessary to alter the “aggregate amount[s] of any 
advance payment[s] of such credit or reductions”233 in order to report on 
those amounts, as 36B(f) requires, or otherwise to carry out the 
provisions of this Section.  
D. “Such Exchange” 
Supporters of the IRS rule claim to have found language in Section 
1321 that either provides a sufficient statutory basis for the rule or 
introduces sufficient statutory ambiguity to trigger Chevron deference. 
As noted above, Section 1321 provides that if a state fails to create the 
“required Exchange” or fails to create an Exchange that complies with 
federal requirements, “the Secretary shall (directly or through agreement 
with a not-for-profit entity) establish and operate such Exchange within 
the State and the Secretary shall take such actions as are necessary to 
implement such other requirements.”234 The Treasury Department writes 
that this language makes “a federally-facilitated exchange the equivalent 
 
231. Jost, supra note 85. 
232. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1401, 124 Stat. 119, 219 (2010). 
233. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152,  
§ 1004, 124 Stat. 1029, 1035 (2010) (amending I.R.C. § 36B(f)). 
234. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1321(c), 124 Stat. 119, 186 (2010) (emphasis added). 
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of a state exchange in all functional respects.”235 Professor Jost 
elaborates: 
By “such Exchange” Congress meant the “required exchange” 
mandated by section 1311. Thus when several subsequent sections 
refer to “an Exchange established by the State under section 
1311,” including the provisions of Internal Revenue Code section 
36B . . . they are referring both to state exchanges and to “such 
exchanges” established within states by the Secretary.236 
In this account, Section 1321’s reference to “such exchange” either 
shoehorns Section 1321 Exchanges into Section 1311 or at least creates 
sufficient ambiguity to allow for the interpretation offered by the IRS. 
Neither claim can be squared with the statute.  
Professor Jost cites the definition of Exchanges the PPACA inserts 
into Section 2791(d) of the Public Health Service Act:237 
Section 1563(b) of the ACA states: “The term ‘Exchange’ means 
an American Health Benefit Exchange established under section 
1311 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.” Section 
1311 literally requires that the states “shall” establish an American 
Health Benefits Exchange by January 1, 2014. Because the 
Constitution prohibits the federal government from literally 
requiring states to establish exchanges, however, section 1321(c), 
provides that “the [HHS] Secretary shall (directly or through 
agreement with a not-for-profit entity) establish and operate such 
Exchange within the State.” Under the ACA’s definition of 
exchange, the term ‘Exchange’ in section 1321 exchange means a 
section 1311 exchange.238  
 
235. See Letter from Mark J. Mazur, Assistant Sec’y for Tax Policy, U.S. 
Treasury Department, to Rep. Darrell Issa, Chairman, Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 
12, 2012) (on file with authors); see also Sam Bagenstos, The Legally 
Flawed Rearguard Challenge to Obamacare, Balkinization (Nov. 27, 
2012), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/11/the-legally-flawed-rearguard-
challenge.html. 
236. Timothy Jost, Tax Credits in Federally Facilitated Exchanges are 
Consistent with the Affordable Care Act’s Language and History, Health 
Affairs Blog (July 18, 2012), http://www.healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/ 
07/18/tax-credits-in-federally-facilitated-exchanges-are-consistent-with-the-
affordable-care-acts-language-and-history/. 
237. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119, 264 (2010) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–91(d)). 
238. Enforcing ObamaCare’s New Rules and Taxes: Before the H. Comm. on 
Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. 2 (Aug. 2, 2012) 
(testimony of Timothy S. Jost), available at http://oversight.house.gov/ 
wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Jost-Testimony.pdf. Note that the PPACA 
contains three separate Sections 1563. 
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He presents this as the plain meaning of Section 1321 rather than an 
ambiguity-based argument because he maintains there are no conflicts 
between Section 1401 and any other part of the statute.239  
 
239. Enforcing ObamaCare’s New Rules and Taxes: Before the H. Comm. on 
Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. (Aug. 2, 2012) (testimony 
of Michael Cannon), video available at http://oversight.house.gov/ 
hearing/irs-enforcing-obamacares-new-rules-and-taxes (unofficial transcript-
tion, beginning at 58:46): 
Rep. Scott DesJarlais (R-TN): Mr. Cannon, is there anything 
stopping the IRS from implementing Section 36B of the Internal 
Revenue Code exactly as written? 
Michael Cannon: 36B is large and complicated, sir. If what you 
mean is the provision restricting tax credits to state-run exchanges, 
no. 
Rep. DesJarlais: Thank you. Mr. Jost. Professor Jost. 
Timothy Jost: 36B, as I explained, if you read the definitions, does 
authorize federal Exchanges to issue a tax credit, so, no, there’s no 
problem. 
Rep. DesJarlais: There’s no problem. Thank you. In one part of the 
law it authorizes tax credits for people who purchase a qualified 
health plan through an Exchange established by the state under 
Section 1311. And even people who defend the IRS on this issue—
such as yourself—Professor Jost, say this part of the law is clear. Is 
there any part of the statute that prevents you from doing just 
that: offering tax credits only in state-run Exchanges? 
Mr. Jost: Again, the definitions. 
Rep. DeJarlais: Mr. Cannon. Is there any part of the statute that 
prevents you from doing just that, offering tax credits? No? 
Mr. Cannon: No, in fact the statute requires that.  
Rep. DesJarlais:  Okay, Is there any part of the statute that 
conflicts with that, Mr. Cannon? 
Mr. Cannon: No. In fact, all other elements of the law support the 
clear meaning of that limitation of tax credits to health insurance 
Exchanges established by the state under Section 1311. And 
“established by the state”—those words are key.  
Rep. DeJarlais:  What about the information-reporting 
requirement? 
Mr. Cannon: That does not conflict. It does require Exchanges 
established under Section 1321, by the federal government, to 
report information related to eligibility for tax credits and the 
advance payment of tax credits to the Treasury Secretary and to 
individuals enrolled through those exchanges. But that does not 
conflict in any way with the limitation of tax credits to state-run 
Exchanges.  
Rep. DeJarlais: Okay, so what is stopping the IRS from 
implementing the tax credit provision exactly as written and the 
Exchanges from implementing the information reporting 
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A plain reading of the statute cannot support this claim. First, in 
each of the above-mentioned examples of equivalence language—the 
HELP Committee bill, the House bill, the PPACA’s authorization of tax 
credits in territorial Exchanges, and the information-reporting 
requirement—Congress explicitly mentioned the two types of Exchange 
between which it sought to draw equivalence and explicitly delineated 
the scope of that equivalence. The definition of “Exchange” in Section 
1563 does neither.  
Second, as noted earlier, Section 1401 expressly and repeatedly 
restricts tax credits to Exchanges “established by the State under section 
1311.” The text of Section 1321 does not support the claim that a 
Section 1321 Exchange is a Section 1311 Exchange. Section 1321 
Exchanges are distinct. They are authorized by a separate section of the 
statute that incorporates Title I’s other Exchange requirements into that 
section. The fact that Congress mentioned them separately when 
amending the PPACA with the HCERA confirms that Congress saw 
them as distinct. The Act contains no language providing that Section 
1311 and 1321 Exchanges shall be equivalent with regard to tax credits. 
Quite the contrary: Section 1321 delineates the scope of that equivalence 
by providing that both types of Exchange are subject to the 
requirements of Title I, which includes the eligibility restrictions on tax 
credits. 
Third, even if a Section 1321 Exchange were deemed to be a Section 
1311 Exchange, it would still not be an Exchange “established by a 
State.” Section 1401 repeatedly requires that recipients of tax credits 
must be enrolled in health insurance through an Exchange that is 
“established by a state.” Section 1311 lists among its “requirements” 
that, for purposes of that section, “[a]n Exchange shall be a 
governmental agency or nonprofit entity that is established by a 
State.”240 However else a Section 1321 Exchange may be like a Section 
1311 Exchange, it cannot be an Exchange “established by a State.” 
The IRS’s claim that federal Exchanges may distribute tax credits 
reduces to the absurd claim that the federal government can establish an 
Exchange that is “established by a state.” Such a notion “violates [the] 
canon of statutory construction . . . that every provision of a 
 
requirement exactly as written? Or can they both be implemented 
exactly as written without conflicting with each other? 
Mr. Cannon: The latter. They can both be implemented exactly as 
written without any conflict.  
Rep. DeJarlais: Agree, Professor Jost? 
Mr. Jost: I would agree because, again, federal Exchanges can issue 
premium tax credits and can report. 
240. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1311(d)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 176 (2010). 
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congressional enactment should be given effect”241 because it would strip 
multiple provisions in Sections 1311 and 1401 of their plain meanings.  
This “such Exchange” defense of the IRS rule also contradicts 
another argument the Treasury Department and Professor Jost offer in 
defense of the rule: that “Congress demonstrated its understanding that 
federal exchanges would administer premium tax credits”242 when the 
HCERA imposed the same information-reporting requirements on 
Exchanges established under both Sections 1311 and 1321.243 If, as 
Professor Jost claims, a “section 1321 exchange means a section 1311 
exchange,” there would have been no need for Congress to mention both 
Section 1311 and Section 1321 Exchanges in the information-reporting 
requirements. If the two are equivalent, the reference to Section 1321 
Exchanges becomes redundant and unnecessary. Jost’s “such Exchange” 
theory turns this reference to Section 1321 Exchanges into surplusage as 
well.  
Professor Jost is nevertheless correct that there is no conflict 
between Section 1401 and Section 1321 or any other provision of the 
statute. Section 1321’s command that the Secretary shall establish “such 
Exchange”244 directs the federal government to create Exchanges that are 
identical to Section 1311 Exchanges, except where Congress has provided 
otherwise. 
E. The “CBO Canon” 
A rather novel defense of the IRS rule is that the IRS has authority 
to issue it because it is consistent with the manner in which the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scored the PPACA.245 Specifically, 
the argument is that the CBO score, including the revenue analysis of 
the law by the Joint Committee on Taxation, are evidence that the law 
was ambiguous and can be interpreted to support the IRS regulation. As 
Professor Jost explains,  
the Joint Committee on Taxation and Congressional Budget Office 
assumed that the tax credits will be available through the federal 
 
241. The Role of the Internal Revenue Service in Health Reform: Before the H. 
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 3 (2012) (testimony 
of Timothy Stoltzfus Jost), available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/Jost-Testimony.pdf 
242. See Jost, supra note 85. 
243. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152,  
§ 1004, 124 Stat. 1029, 1035 (2010). 
244. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1321(c), 124 Stat. 119, 186 (2010). 
245. See Abbe Gluck, The “CBO Canon” and the Debate Over Tax Credits on 
Federally Operated Health Insurance Exchanges, Balkinization (July 10, 
2012, 8:55 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/07/cbo-canon-and-
debate-over-tax-credits.html; see also Shulman, supra note 77. 
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exchange. This is how the IRS and HHS have interpreted the law . 
. . and is clearly what Congress intended.246 
If the actions of the CBO and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) 
are not enough in themselves to demonstrate Congressional intent, 
Professor Abbe Gluck argues that there should be an “interpretive 
presumption” that statutory ambiguities “should be construed in the 
way most consistent with the assumptions underlying the congressional 
budget score on which the initial legislation was based.”247 According to 
Gluck, because Congress “drafts in the shadow” of CBO budget scores, 
the CBO score “offers better evidence of congressional ‘intent’ than 
other commonly consulted non-textual tools, including legislative 
history.”248 Alternatively, if the CBO score is not evidence that the 
statute supports the IRS rule, the existence of a CBO score consistent 
with the rule could at least suggest that the statute is sufficiently 
ambiguous to allow for the rule. 
This theory of statutory construction raises interesting questions, 
none of which need be addressed here. The CBO score of the PPACA’s 
Exchange provisions is entirely consistent with the plain text of the 
statute and the prevailing assumptions about how these provisions 
would operate in practice.249 The JCT and CBO produced revenue and 
spending estimates that assumed tax credits would be available in all 
fifty states. But this is not the same as “assum[ing] that the tax credits 
will be available through the federal exchange,” and neither the CBO 
nor JCT stated such an assumption when conducting their analysis. 
Indeed, the CBO has acknowledged it did not conduct a legal analysis of 
whether the statute authorizes tax credits through federal Exchanges.250 
 
246. Timothy Jost, Implementing Reform: Funding and Flexibility for States on 
Exchanges, Health Affairs Blog (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.health 
affairs.org/blog/2011/11/30/implementing-reform-funding-and-flexibility-
for-states-on-exchanges. IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman has also 
made this argument. See John Gramlich, GOP Prepares Efforts to 
Challenge IRS Rule on Health Insurance Subsidies, CQ Today, July 9, 
2012. 
247. Gluck, supra note 245.  
248. Id.  
249. Robert Pear, U.S. Officials Brace for Huge Task of Operating Health 
Exchanges, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2012, at A17 (“When Congress passed 
legislation to expand coverage two years ago, Mr. Obama and lawmakers 
assumed that every state would set up its own exchange . . . .”). 
250. See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget 
Office, to Rep. Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform (Dec. 6, 2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/ 
default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43752-letterToChairmanIssa.pdf; see 
also Letter from Rep. Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform (Nov. 30, 2012), available at 
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Thus its cost projections can hardly be considered authoritative. Like 
many of the PPACA’s supporters, it appears the CBO and JCT simply 
assumed that every state would create its own Exchange and 
incorporated that miscalculation into their projections. Further evidence 
for this interpretation, if more were needed, is that the CBO made no 
mention of the hundreds of millions of dollars it would take to establish 
and operate federally run Exchanges (just as Congress didn’t authorize 
those funds).251 The CBO simply assumed every state would establish its 
own Exchange and did not even consider the question of what would 
happen if they did not. There is no basis for relying upon CBO or JCT 
budget projections to overturn or alter the plain meaning of the 
PPACA’s text. 
VI. Standing to Challenge the IRS Rule 
The fact that the IRS rule exceeds the scope of the authority 
Congress delegated to the agency and is contrary to law does not 
necessarily mean there is recourse. It can be particularly difficult to 
challenge IRS implementation of a statute where, as here, the IRS’ 
alleged malfeasance consists of granting tax benefits and federal subsidies 
to others. As Professor Jost initially argued, “there will be no judicial 
review of this determination. It is not possible to conceive of a person 
who would be injured in fact by this interpretation of the rule such that 
they could present a case or controversy under Article III.”252 In the 
normal case, this could be true. Given how Section 1401 interacts with 
the rest of the PPACA’s intricate regulatory structure, however, there 
could be standing for millions of employers and individuals to challenge 
the IRS rule.253 
 
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/2012-11-30-DEI-
to-Elmendorf-CBO-PPACA-tax-credits.pdf.pdf [sic]. 
251. For example, in a letter to the ranking member of the House 
Appropriations Committee, the CBO detailed the administrative costs to 
the federal government of implementing the PPACA but made no mention 
of Exchange-implementation costs. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, 
Director, Congressional Budget Office, to Jerry Lewis, Ranking Member, 
Committee on Appropriations (May 11, 2010), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/114xx/doc11490 
/lewisltr_hr3590.pdf. 
252. Jost, supra note 85. 
253. Professor Jost has since acknowledged this point. See Timothy Jost, Tax 
Credits in Federally Facilitated Exchanges are Consistent with the 
Affordable Care Act’s Language and History, Health Affairs Blog 
(July 18, 2012), http://www.healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/07/18/tax-credits-
in-federally-facilitated-exchanges-are-consistent-with-the-affordable-care-
acts-language-and-history (“The only viable challengers to the law are 
employers who may in the future have to pay an exaction because they fail 
to offer their employees insurance (or affordable or adequate insurance) 
and their employees consequently end up receiving tax credits in the 
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A plaintiff must have Article III standing to challenge the legality of 
a federal agency action in federal court. Specifically, under Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, the “irreducible constitutional minimum of 
standing” has three parts.254 First, the “plaintiff must have suffered an 
‘injury in fact’” that is both “actual or imminent” and “concrete and 
particularized.”255 Second, there must be a “causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of.”256 Third, there must be a 
sufficient likelihood that “the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable 
decision.’”257 When an individual or corporation is the subject of a 
government action, standing is relatively easy to satisfy. A plaintiff 
always has standing to challenge a government action that is directed 
against him. So, for instance, an individual or corporation would have 
standing to challenge the imposition of an allegedly illegal tax assessed 
against them.258 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, with few exceptions 
not relevant here,259 federal taxpayers lack Article III standing to 
challenge the allegedly illegal or even unconstitutional expenditure of 
federal funds. In DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, for example, the Court 
held unanimously that taxpayers lacked Article III standing to challenge 
 
federal exchanges.”). He may, however, be wrong about employers being 
the only viable challengers. See infra notes 269-78 and accompanying text. 
254. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see also Friends 
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000); 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998); Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 
(1995); Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of 
America v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663 (1993) (restating the 
minimum requirements of Article III standing articulated in Lujan). 
255. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 561 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 
U.S. 26, 28 (1976)). 
258. While standing is easy to establish in such cases, there may be other 
barriers to obtaining prompt judicial review. The Anti-Injunction Act, for 
example, provides that, as a general rule, “no suit for the purpose of 
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in 
any court by any person.” This restriction can prevent judicial review of a 
tax before it is collected, but does not affect a plaintiff’s Article III 
standing to sue. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1954).  
259. These exceptions concern challenges legislative appropriations alleged to 
violate the First Amendment’s prohibition on the establishment of religion. 
See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 
608-09 (2007). Whether these exceptions are coherent or not is another 
question. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, God, Gaia, the Taxpayer, and 
the Lorax: Standing, Justiciability, and Separation of Powers After 
Massachusetts and Hein, 20 Regent U. L. Rev. 175 (2008). 
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a state’s award of preferential tax credits to a local manufacturer.260 As 
the Court explained in Frothingham v. Mellon, a taxpayer’s interest in 
the federal treasury is indistinct, “minute and indeterminable,” and “the 
effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, 
fluctuating and uncertain.”261 As a consequence, a taxpayer’s alleged 
injury from the illegal expenditure of federal funds is not “concrete and 
particularized,” nor is it “actual or imminent.”262  
The logic that precludes taxpayer standing to challenge the allegedly 
illegal expenditure of taxpayer dollars is “equally applicable” to tax 
credits and other targeted tax preferences.263 As Chief Justice Roberts 
explained for the Court in Cuno, a federal taxpayer would lack standing 
to challenge a tax credit or exemption; “[i]n either case, the alleged 
injury is based on the asserted effect of the allegedly illegal activity on 
public revenues, to which the taxpayer contributes.”264 As a consequence, 
individual taxpayers or even taxpayer organizations would lack standing 
to challenge the legality of the IRS’ decision to offer tax credits and 
subsidies to those who purchase health insurance on federally run 
Exchanges.  
These barriers would not preclude a legal challenge to the IRS rule, 
however. First, the issuance of a tax credit for the purchase of a 
qualifying health insurance plan in a federal Exchange triggers the 
penalty for the so-called “employer mandate.”265 Specifically, under 
Section 1513, when an employee of a company with more than fifty 
employees receives a tax credit for purchasing insurance on an Exchange, 
the employer is assessed a penalty of up to $2,000 per worker.266 If the 
federal government lacks the legal authority to offer tax credits through 
a federal Exchange, then any employer that would be penalized as a 
result of one of those tax credits should have standing to challenge the 
IRS rule. Such an employer would have to demonstrate that it is covered 
by the employer mandate, does not provide a qualifying level of health 
 
260. 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006). 
261. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). 
262. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 344 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560 (1992)). 
263. Id. at 343-44. 
264. Id. at 344. 
265. As far as the authors are aware, the first person to makes this point was 
Professor James Blumstein. See David Hogberg, Companies Could 
Challenge ObamaCare Employer Fines, Investor’s Bus. Daily (Sept. 16, 
2011, 5:46 PM), http://news.investors.com/article/585053/201109161746/ 
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266. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1513, 124 Stat. 119, 253-54 (2010), amended by Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1003, 124 
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insurance to its employees, and is located in a state that has opted not 
to create an Exchange. Insofar as the employer-mandate penalty is 
considered to be a tax, it could be subject to the Anti-Injunction Act, 
which prevents taxpayers from challenging the legality of a tax before 
that tax is assessed.267 If so, this would only affect the timing of such a 
suit and would not prevent a suitable employer from establishing 
standing to challenge the rule. Certain religious employers would have 
an additional incentive to challenge the IRS rule. The PPACA mandates 
that all health plans provide first-dollar coverage for preventive services. 
HHS has defined this standard to include all forms of contraception 
approved by the federal Food and Drug Administration. Employers from 
certain religious denominations have objected to this mandate because 
they consider such forms of contraception to be immoral. Dozens of 
employers have filed suit claiming the contraceptives mandate violates 
their conscience rights as protected by the federal Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act and the First Amendment.268 Such employers have an 
additional incentive to challenge the IRS rule. If the direct challenges to 
the contraceptives mandates fail, then blocking the IRS rule would 
enable those employers to stay true to their consciences and avoid the 
contraceptives mandate by dropping their employee health benefits 
without penalty. 
Second, many individuals could be able to challenge the rule on the 
grounds that the issuance of unauthorized tax credits in federal 
Exchanges strips them of the “affordability exemption” from the 
individual mandate and therefore exposes them to penalties under the 
individual mandate and/or deprives them of the ability to purchase low-
cost “catastrophic plans” that the PPACA makes available to those who 
qualify for the affordability exemption. As noted above, the individual 
mandate exempts non-compliant taxpayers from penalties if their out-of-
 
267. Whether the penalty would be considered a tax for Anti-Injunction Act 
purposes is not clear. In NFIB v. Sebelius, the Court unanimously 
concluded that the act did not bar suit against the “individual mandate,” 
even though a majority of the Court upheld the mandate as a tax. See 132 
S. Ct. 2566, 2583 (2012) (“Congress can, of course, describe something as a 
penalty but direct that it nonetheless be treated as a tax for purposes of 
the Anti-Injunction Act. For example, 26 U.S.C. § 6671(a) provides that 
‘any reference in this title to “tax” imposed by this title shall be deemed 
also to refer to the penalties and liabilities provided by’ subchapter 68B 
of the Internal Revenue Code. Penalties in subchapter 68B are thus treated 
as taxes under Title 26, which includes the Anti-Injunction Act. The 
individual mandate, however, is not in subchapter 68B of the Code.”). 
268. See, e.g., Legatus v. Sebelius, No. 12-12061, 2012 WL 5359630 (E.D. Mich. 
Oct. 31, 2012); Wheaton College v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 3637162 (D.D.C. 
2012); see also David Gibson, Catholic Groups File Suit over HHS Birth 
Control Mandate, Wash. Post (May 21, 2012), http://articles. 
washingtonpost.com/2012-05-21/national/35458658_1_catholic-groups-
mandate-dioceses (noting “dozens” of Catholic institutions had filed suit 
against the so-called “contraception mandate”). 
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pocket costs for health insurance (i.e., their “required contribution”) 
exceeds 8 percent of household income. Under the statute, if a state does 
not establish an Exchange, the “required contribution” equals the 
premium for the lowest-cost plan available to the taxpayer through the 
federal Exchange because there are no tax credits to reduce the 
“required contribution” below that premium.  
If the IRS nevertheless issues unauthorized tax credits through a 
federal Exchange, then those tax credits could reduce many taxpayers’ 
“required contributions” from above the 8 percent threshold to below 
that threshold, thereby depriving them of the affordability exemption. 
For individuals who prefer not to purchase health insurance, the loss of 
the affordability exemption would expose them to penalties. In 2016, 
those penalties can range from $695 for some individuals to $2,085 for 
families of four. Individuals age thirty and over who desire to purchase 
health insurance would also suffer injury. The PPACA makes low-cost 
“catastrophic plans” available to individuals under age thirty. 
Individuals over thirty are generally barred from purchasing such low-
cost plans unless they qualify for the affordability exemption from the 
individual mandate.269 When the IRS rule strips such individuals of the 
affordability exemption, they will lose the right to purchase this low-cost 
health insurance option. 
Individuals could establish standing by demonstrating that they live 
in a state that will not establish an Exchange by 2014, that they would 
qualify for the affordability exemption in the absence of tax credits, that 
the affordability exemption would have value to them (either because 
they plan not to purchase health insurance or to purchase a catastrophic 
plan), and that the IRS rule would deny them the exemption. To satisfy 
that last element, individuals would have to show, among other criteria, 
they are between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty level, that 
they will not have “minimum value coverage” in 2014 (either because 
they are uninsured or because they purchase less coverage than the 
mandate requires), and that they do not receive an offer of “minimum 
value” and “affordable” coverage from an employer. Some twelve million 
currently uninsured individuals would likely meet those criteria.270 Each 
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is a potential plaintiff, assuming their state does not establish an 
Exchange. The thirty-four states that had by February 15, 2013, 
signaled their intent not to establish an Exchange are home to some 
eight million currently uninsured individuals who could have standing. 
In addition, many insured individuals could establish standing if, for 
example, they purchase a high-deductible health plan that fails to satisfy 
the mandate because it has an actuarial value below 60 percent.271 
Potentially millions of additional individuals could establish standing if 
they desire to use the affordability exemption to purchase catastrophic 
plans. 
The Anti-Injunction Act is unlikely to impede a challenge brought 
by individual taxpayers. The Supreme Court unanimously concluded in 
NFIB v. Sebelius that the individual mandate penalty, while it may be 
considered a tax for constitutional purposes, is not a tax for Anti-
Injunction Act purposes.272 Thus a challenge brought by individual 
taxpayers should be able to receive immediate adjudication. 
States that choose not to establish an Exchange that satisfies the 
PPACA’s requirements should also have standing to challenge the IRS 
rule. States have sovereign interests that are often sufficient to establish 
standing to challenge federal actions.273 Specifically, where the federal 
government acts on states as states, and directly affects state interests, 
states may have standing to challenge such actions in federal court.274 So, 
for instance, where a statute creates a regulatory mechanism that acts 
on state governments, an objecting state has standing under the 
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(2012). 
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Administrative Procedure Act to challenge federal regulatory actions 
that compromise state interests in violation of the authorizing statute.275 
In Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, the US Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit rejected Virginia’s standing to challenge the 
individual mandate because Virginia could not assert any interests 
beyond seeking to protect Virginia citizens.276 Here, however, states could 
claim that the IRS rule directly affects state interests created by the 
PPACA. The health care law, as written, gives states a choice of 
whether to create an Exchange that complies with the Act’s 
requirements in return for start-up funds, tax credits, subsidies, and tax 
penalties on employers and a greater number of individual residents. The 
IRS rule, however, eliminates the choice by providing for tax credits, 
subsidies, and tax penalties without regard to whether a state creates its 
own Exchange. Insofar as this rule eliminates a choice that the statute 
reserved to the states, an objecting state should have standing to 
challenge the legality of the rule.277 
Litigation over the IRS rule is not merely hypothetical. As this 
Article goes to press, a lawsuit challenging the IRS filed by the State of 
Oklahoma is pending in federal court.278 Additional suits, either by other 
states, employers seeking to avoid the tax penalties, or individuals 
injured by the loss of the affordability exemption, may follow. 
Conclusion 
The IRS rule’s attempt to offer premium-assistance tax credits 
through federal Exchanges lacks validity because the IRS lacks the legal 
authority to create entitlements where, as here, Congress has not 
authorized them. Congress has granted the IRS authority to offer 
premium-assistance tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies only through 
Exchanges that are “a governmental agency or nonprofit entity that is 
established by a State.”279 The IRS lacks the authority to offer those 
entitlements, to enforce the employer mandate, and in many cases to 
enforce the individual mandate, in states that opt for either a “federally 
facilitated” Exchange or a “partnership” Exchange.280 The IRS rule 
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unlawfully usurps Congress’ exclusive powers to tax, to create new legal 
entitlements, to issue tax credits, and to spend federal dollars. 
The Act’s legislative history shows the plain meaning of the statute 
reflects congressional intent and offers no evidence to support claims 
that the plain meaning of this statute deviates from that intent. The IRS 
rule does not correct a scrivener’s error. The rule neither resolves a 
textual ambiguity nor resolves an ambiguity regarding congressional 
intent—because there is no ambiguity. There is only a frantic, last-ditch 
search for ambiguity by supporters who belatedly recognize the PPACA 
threatens health insurance markets with collapse, which in turn 
threatens the PPACA.281  
Finally, because these unauthorized entitlements would trigger 
unauthorized penalties against employers and individuals, we find that 
those employers (including state governments) and individuals could 
meet the requisite tests for standing and challenge the constitutionality 
of this IRS rule in federal court.  
Administrative agencies enjoy wide latitude to interpret and 
implement federal law. But they cannot rewrite laws to impose taxes, 
issue tax credits, spend federal revenue, incur new federal debt, or create 
new legal entitlements without congressional authorization. If the 
PPACA imposes an unsustainable regulatory scheme on markets for 
health insurance, the remedy must be found in the political process. It 
cannot be fixed by administrative fiat.  
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